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MARKET MYOPIA’S CLIMATE BUBBLE 
Madison Condon* 
 
A growing number of financial institutions, ranging from BlackRock to the Bank 
of England, have warned that markets may not be accurately incorporating climate 
change-related risks into asset prices. This Article seeks to explain how this 
mispricing can exist at the level of individual assets drawing from scholarship on 
corporate governance and the mechanisms of market (in)efficiency. Market actors: 
1. Lack the fine-grained asset-level data they need in order to assess risk exposure; 
2.  Continue to rely on outdated means of assessing risk; 3. Have misaligned 
incentives resulting in climate-specific agency costs; 4. Have myopic biases 
exacerbated by climate change misinformation; and 5. Are impeded by captured 
regulators distorting the market. Further, trends in institutional share ownership 
reinforce apathy regarding assessment of firm-specific fundamentals, especially 
over long-term horizons.  
 
This underpricing of corporate climate risk contributes to the negative effects of 
climate change itself, as the mispricing of risk in the present leads to a misallocation 
of investment capital, hindering future adaptation and subsidizing future fossil 
combustion. These risks could accumulate to the macroeconomic scale, generating 
a systemic risk to the financial system. While a broad array of government 
interventions are necessary to mitigate climate related financial risks, this Article 
focuses on proposals for corporate governance and securities regulation—and their 
limits. Signals from the Biden Administration suggest that mandatory climate risk 
disclosure regulation from the Securities and Exchange Commission is 
forthcoming. This Article argues that climate risk disclosure is necessary, though 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2016, a duo of computer scientists undertook the laborious task of creating a 
map of U.S. Internet infrastructure, indicating where cable was laid and where 
colocation centers were based.1 Because the whereabouts of this privately-owned 
infrastructure is kept secret by telecommunication companies, the researchers spent 
years scraping the web for scattered publicly available information about 
infrastructure location.2 When one of the researchers showed the results of his work 
to his wife, a climate scientist, she immediately remarked that much of the 
infrastructure was located in coastal regions at risk to be inundated by sea level rise 
induced flooding as soon as the coming decade. All three scientists then worked 
together, publishing a study showing that thousands of miles of fiber optic cable, 
and more than a thousand nodes of key Internet infrastructure, could be underwater 
in the next 15 years.3 The researchers also identified which providers had the most 
infrastructure at risk, concluding that AT&T and CenturyLink were the most 
exposed to the risks of sea-level rise.4  
Any investors in these two companies paying attention to the 2018 study were 
likely surprised by its findings: neither of these companies’ recent 10K filings, 
meant to disclose potential risks to investors, had made any mention of sea-level 
rise.5 Their voluntary reporting of climate risks to the nonprofit CDP similarly 
omitted any mention of flood risk.6   
* * * 
A growing number of financial experts at institutions ranging from BlackRock, 
to McKinsey, to the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission, have reached 
 
 
1 Alejandra Borunda, The Internet Is Drowning, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (July 16, 2018). 
2 Id.  
3 Ramakrishnan Durairajan, Carol Barford & Paul Barford, Lights Out: Climate Change Risk to 
Internet Infrastructure, ANRW ‘18: PROCEEDINGS OF THE APPLIED NETWORKING RESEARCH 
WORKSHOP 9 (2018). 
4 Id. 
5 CenturyLink, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/18926/000001892619000006/ctl2018123110k.htm; 
AT&T, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2019),  
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000732717/000119312519045608/d705958d10k.htm. 
6 CenturyLink’s 2017 voluntary disclosure of climate risks to the nonprofit Carbon Disclosure 
Project (“CDP”), the company made no mention of sea level rise. In 2018 it updated its disclosure 
to acknowledge rising sea levels as a long-term risk with an impact valued at $2 million, see 
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the conclusion that markets are not accurately assessing and pricing climate change-
related risks. In April 2019, a coalition of 42 central banks recognized that “there 
is a strong risk that climate-related financial risks are not fully reflected in asset 
valuations.”7 Christine Lagarde recently warned that central bankers “will have to 
ask themselves” if they are “taking excessive risk by simply trusting mechanisms 
that have not priced in the massive risk that is out there.”8 According to one survey, 
93% of institutional investors agree with her that climate risk “has yet to be priced 
in by all the key financial markets globally.”9 
Yet while the consensus (and evidence)10 grows that assets are mispriced, there 
has been less attention paid to diagnosing why that might be; what are these faulty 
“mechanisms” that Lagarde says are not to be trusted?11 This Article seeks to 
explain how this mispricing can exist at the level of individual assets, disputing 
academic claims that climate risks are “already reflected in market price[s].”12 
Contrary to recent arguments in the corporate law literature, there is in fact ample 
reason to believe that equity analysts “are systematically less able to assess the 
valuation impacts” of climate risks.13  
First, shareholders and analysts currently lack the fine-grained asset level data 
they need in order to make climate-risk assessments.14 Where corporate operations 
 
 
7 NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, A CALL FOR ACTION: CLIMATE CHANGE AS A 
SOURCE OF FINANCIAL RISK 4 (Apr. 2019) [hereinafter NGFS, CALL FOR ACTION]. 
8 Carolynn Look, Lagarde Says ECB Needs to Question Market Neutrality on Climate, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-14/lagarde-says-ecb-needs-to-
question-market-neutrality-on-climate. 
9 Climate Change and Artificial Intelligence Seen as Risks to Investment Asset Allocation, Finds 
New Report by BNY Mellon Investment, BLOOMBERG, (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2019-09-16/climate-change-and-artificial-intelligence-
seen-as-risks-to-investment-asset-allocation-finds-new-report-by-bny-mellon-investm. 
10 See infra section II.A. 
11 With the noted exception of Jakob Thomä & Hughes Chenet, Transition Risks and Market 
Failure: A Theoretical Discourse on Why Financial Models and Economic Agents may Misprice 
Risk Related to the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy, 7 J. SUS. FIN. & INVESTMENT 82 (2017). 
12 Brest, Gilson & Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social Value, (European 
Corporate Governance Institute L. Working Paper No. 394, 2018), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalbrestgilsonwolfson.pdf. 
13 Id. 
14 Infra section II.B.1. A note on terminology. When “value-relevant” information about a company 
is withheld from the market, that information cannot be reflected in share price, and so prices diverge 
from “fundamental efficiency,” or the “correct” price, meaning the discounted present value of 
expected cash flows from holding the stock. The assertion that stock prices reflect all publicly 
available information is the “semi-strong” version of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis 
(ECMH) (the strong version of the ECMH, that prices reflect all information, even information kept 
internal to the firm, has been widely accepted as untrue). As the following reasons show, this Article 
argues that with respect to climate risks, markets are both fundamentally inefficient (not reflecting 
true underlying value) and informationally inefficient (not reflecting information that is already 
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are located, the origins and routes of their supply chains, the sources and quantities 
of inputs like water and energy –– this is the type of information needed to assess 
climate risk exposure but is not the type of information currently disclosed in 
financial reports.15 Often, the information that is voluntarily disclosed aggregates 
data at too high a level, is given at widely varying time-scales that make comparison 
difficult, and fail to differentiate well between exposure and liability.16 
Second, market actors continue to rely on risk assessment methodologies that 
are outdated in a climate-changed world.17 They may employ strategies that expose 
them to model risk, such as relying on unrepresentative historical records to project 
future exposure. And traditional means of risk assessment may ignore latent risks: 
The entire capital stock of corporate America was built using engineering 
specifications designed to endure certain temperature and weather extremes that 
may be regularly exceeded under a climate-changed world. A facility that was built 
to withstand a “100-year flood” may now have a much higher likelihood of failure. 
Additionally, corporate managers may continue to rely on outdated methods of risk 
assessment which may suffer from a duration mismatch. Insurance premiums, for 
example, can no longer be relied upon to serve as a proxy for the cost of physical 
risk on a contemplated project; returns are calculated over many years, but 
premiums can change annually. 
Third, corporate managers, with an eye toward maintaining a high share price, 
have little incentive to discover and disclose information that might reveal their 
company’s stock price is overvalued.18 Equity-based compensation and firm-
specific executive remuneration metrics may encourage managers to focus on the 
 
 
publicly known, or knowable with presently available data and analytical tools). See, e.g., Ronald 
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency after the Financial Crisis: It's Still a Matter of 
Information Costs, 100 VA . L. REV. 313, 317 (2014) (discussing relationship between fundamental 
and informational efficiency).  
15 See, e.g., NGFS, CALL FOR ACTION, supra note X at 30; MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE U.S. 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE CLIMATE-RELATED MARKET RISK SUBCOMMITTEE, MARKET 
RISK ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 58 (2020) 
[hereinafter CFTC REPORT]; DEUTSCHE ASSET MANAGEMENT, MEASURING PHYSICAL CLIMATE 
RISKS IN EQUITY PORTFOLIOS 2 (Nov. 2017); WORLD BANK & WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, SPATIAL 
FINANCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD EFI INSIGHT-FINANCE (2020). 
16 Infra section II.B.1. 
17 Infra section II.B.2. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis supra 
note X at 343-44 (discussing how valuation models employed by banks and ratings agencies failed 
because they relied on historical housing price data to model future risk and ignored warnings of 
high unaccounted-for correlations between assets). 
18 Infra Section II.B.3. See, e.g., John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking 
Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. REG. 1, 26-31 (2020) (arguing that stock-based, including 
options-based, executive compensation models incentivize corporate managers to neglect risk 
management programs, to the detriment of the long-term value of the stock).  
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short-term and neglect to prepare their companies for longer term climate 
resilience.19 
Fourth, many physical climate risks will occur within the relevant horizon for 
valuing securities but outside of conventional risk assessment horizons for 
investors.20 The investors with the longest investment horizons largely follow an 
indexing, or quasi-indexing strategy—passively holding their funds instead of 
spending resources to research firm-specific fundamental values.21 While investors 
continue to shift their money into funds with an “environmental, social, and 
governance” (ESG) focus, perhaps suggesting an awareness of climate risks, there 
is insufficient scrutiny of index providers and their climate-related 
methodologies.22 
Fifth, decades-long disinformation campaigns have intentionally confused 
public understanding of the cause and effects of climate change.23 Lessons from 
behavioral finance tell us that investors and corporate managers can be slow to 
integrate new information, can be irrationally myopic, can overvalue short-term 
gains and undervalue longer-term losses – all of which, in the context of climate 
change, serves to maintain apathy regarding mitigation investment and long-term 
risk avoidance.24  
Sixth and finally, shareholders concerned about climate risk have begun to press 
for voluntary disclosure from companies, but their efforts face opposition from 
corporate management both directly and through industry influence on government 
regulators.25 Under the Trump Administration several agencies took actions to limit 
shareholder oversight of climate risks, including blocking requests for climate 
 
 
19 Cf. Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MANAG. 5, 7 (2005). 
20 See, e.g., 2 DEGREE INVESTING INITIATIVE, ALL SWANS ARE BLACK: HOW THE SHORT-TERM 
FOCUS ON FINANCIAL ANALYSIS DOES NOT SHED LIGHT ON LONG TERM RISKS (Feb. 2017); Lynne 
Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267 
(2012). 
21 Infra section II.B.4. 
22 See, e.g., Joe Rennison & Billy Nauman, Vanguard ‘Green’ Fund Invests in Oil and Gas-Related 
Stocks, FIN. TIMES (July 10, 2019); Adriana Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated 
Management and “Index” Investing, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 795, 848 (2019). 
23 See, e.g., NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF 
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 
(2010). 
24 Infra section II.B.5. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the 
SEC, 56 STANFORD L. REV. 8 (2003), citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127-28 (1974). 
25 Infra section II.B.6. 
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disclosure and preventing investors from integrating climate risks into their market 
decisions.26 
No amount of regulatory or corporate governance intervention can give 
shareholders and managers the ability to foresee the future – the outcomes of 
national elections, for example, are both largely uncertain and hugely influential in 
determining the strength of future climate policy. However, there are actions within 
the power of both market actors and government regulators that can help to counter 
the unfolding market failure that is the continued neglect of assessing companies’ 
exposure to foreseeable climate risks. Net global sea-level rise over the next 15 
years, for example, can be predicted with some certainty, and yet market actors 
nevertheless seem to disregard these projections when making asset-allocation 
decisions.27 
The widespread underassessment of climate risk may lead to two undesirable 
economy-wide harms: 1) systemic risk to the financial system and 2) the physical 
damages stemming from climate change itself, as mispriced equity leads to mis-
allocation of investment resources.28 If investors fail to demand risk assessment 
from companies, managers may be left unpunished by the market when they build 
homes and hotels in hurricane prone regions too close to the shore, or build bridges 
to withstand a “100-year-flood” based on a grossly unrepresentative historical 
record. This mis-investment imposes costs not just on the company and the 
investor, but on the communities harmed by collapsing bridges and hotel evacuees. 
Addressing climate-risk neglect will require an array of actions, from regulators 
and investors alike. Growing calls for mandatory climate risk disclosure, trends in 
other countries, and signals from the Biden Administration, suggest a mandatory 
climate-risk disclosure regime may be forthcoming in the United States.29 This 
 
 
26 Fair Access to Financial Services, 85 Fed. Reg. 75,261 (Nov. 25, 2020) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 55); Brett McDonnell, Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel, & Anita Foerster, Green 
Boardrooms? CONN. L. REV., forthcoming at 47 (2021).  
27 See, e.g., Theodore Shepherd, Storyline Approach to the Construction of Regional Climate 
Change Information, 475 PROC. R. SOC. A 1-2 (2019) (pointing out that “although there is high 
confidence in thermodynamic aspects of climate change (global warming, sea-level rise, 
atmospheric moistening, melting of ice), the levels of confidence concerning dynamical aspects of 
climate change, such as the location and strength of storm tracks, are much lower”).  
28 Infra section III. 
29 See e.g., Emily Glazer, Companies Brace Themselves for New ESG Regulations Under Biden, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-brace-themselves-for-new-
esg-regulations-under-biden-11610719200?mod=searchresults_pos3&page=1; CERES, Ceres 
Applauds SEC on Creating New Climate Position, Hiring Satyam Khanna (Feb. 1, 2021), 
https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/ceres-applauds-sec-creating-new-climate-
position-hiring-satyam-khanna; Kate Davidson, Yellen is Creating a New Senior Treasury Post for 
Climate Czar, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2021); Larry Elliott, UK to Make Climate Risk Reports 
Mandatory for Large Companies GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2020). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782675
Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble 
 
    8 
Article supports this agenda, and provides some high-level guidance on how to 
design regulation to address the drivers of climate risk mispricing. Any mandatory 
climate risk disclosure regime has to meet climate science where it is. Regulators 
must pay particular attention to the spatial and temporal scales of requested 
disclosures, and ensure they are both scientifically feasible, and tailored to industry-
specific needs.30 In particular, an overemphasis on false precision provided by 
complicated models might obscure the usefulness of other methods of risk 
assessment and communication.31 This fact should inform how the SEC decides to 
structure climate risk disclosure compliance, including balancing the pros and cons 
of principles-based versus line-item disclosures.32 In crafting disclosure regulation, 
the SEC should seek out climate-related expertise through interagency working 
groups, advisory boards, and staff hiring.33 Further, the SEC should 1. Require 
methods for addressing uncertainty, including scenario analysis 2. Work with 
auditors and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and 3. Facilitate 
disclosure and market response through public provision of climate-risk analytical 
tools.34  
No amount of disclosure, however, can protect the market from climate change. 
The only path toward financial stability requires halting emissions. The CFTC 
Subcommittee’s report on Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System 
acknowledges this and lists reducing emissions as its first recommendation.35 
However, direct regulation is also required to address physical risks and adaptation 
deficits, not just mitigation deficits. Climate adaptation requires planning at the 
national level. Beyond the “market failure” of emissions externalities, there is a 
limit to what increased disclosure can facilitate in the face of systemic risks; climate 
risks remain unhedgeable even with increased information.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II collects evidence of climate mispricing, 
including empirical studies examining how well the market has priced the 1.1C of 
warming that has already occurred and models of climate impacts on portfolios. It 
then enumerates six distinct drivers of asset mispricing in the climate context, and 
explains why neither arbitrage nor private ordering through requests for voluntary 
disclosures can correct these market failures. Part III argues that there is a societal 
 
 
30 See e.g., Tanya Fielder et al., Business Risk and the Emergence of Climate Analytics, NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2021); Standards Overview, Sustainability Accounting Standards Bd. 
31 See e.g., Fielder et al., supra note X. 
32 See note X infra, discussing Allison Herren Lee, “Modernizing” Regulation S-K; Ignoring the 
Elephant in the Room SEC Public Statement (Jan. 30, 2020). 
33 See MADISON CONDON, SARAH LADIN, JACK LIENKE, MICHAEL PANFIL, & ALEXANDER SONG, 
MANDATING DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISKS, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY 
INTEGRITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND (2021). 
34 See section IV.A infra.  
35 CFTC REPORT, supra note X at X.  
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interest to correcting this mispricing, beyond individual investor protection, as the 
inaccuracy may lead to: 1) systemic risk to the financial system and 2) the physical 
damages stemming from climate change itself, as mispriced equity leads to mis-
allocation of investment resources. Part IV discusses recommendations for 
regulators and investors. Part V concludes.  
II. CLIMATE RISK AND EQUITY-MISVALUATION 
 
Climate risks facing the financial sector are typically broken down into three 
categories: transition risk, physical risk, and liability risk.36 Transition risk comes 
from a failure to adapt in time to a changing, less carbon-intensive economy as 
governments begin to regulate emissions, and alternative energy falls in price. 
“Stranded assets” in the fossil fuel industry are the classic example of transition 
risk.37 Physical risks are the threats faced by all industries that come from the 
changing climate itself. They include the impact of sea-level rise on the real estate 
sector, decreased labor productivity from hotter days, reductions in agricultural 
output due to droughts or floods, and many others.38 Liability risks are the potential 
that the parties that contribute to, or profit from, carbon emissions, are required at 
some point in the future to compensate those harmed by climate impacts.39  
 
 
36 These are the categories identified by Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, see 
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, International Climate Risk Conference for 
Supervisors, De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam: A Transition in Thinking and Action (Apr. 6, 
2018). 
37 Christopher McGlade & Paul Ekins, The Geographical Distribution of Fossil Fuels Unused When 
Limiting Global Warming to 2°C, 517 NATURE 187 (2015) (estimating that in order to keep warming 
below 2°C, “approximately 35% of current oil reserves, 50% of gas reserves, and nearly 90% of 
coal reserves are unusable”); Mark Lewis et al., Energy Transition and Climate Change: Stranded 
Assets, Fossilised Revenues, KEPLER CHEUVREUX 16 (2014) (calculating that if greenhouse gas are 
kept below 450ppm of CO2 equivalent in the atmosphere, the fossil fuel industry will lose $28 
trillion in projected revenue through 2035, with the oil industry experiencing a 22% total decline in 
revenues); EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD, TOO LATE, TOO SUDDEN: TRANSITION  TO A LOW-
CARBON ECONOMY AND SYSTEMIC RISK, ESRB ASC REPORT No. 6 (Feb. 2016); Thomas Lee, Fossil 
Fuel Stranded Assets: Efficient Market or Carbon Bubble?, PENN WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(April 12, 2017). 
38 The Risky Business Project, co-chaired by Michael Bloomberg, former mayor of New York, 
Henry Paulson, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and Tom Steyer, hedge fund manager and 
philanthropist, attempts to quantify specific costs to business. See generally THE RISKY BUSINESS 
PROJECT, RISKY BUSINESS: THE ECONOMIC RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2014). 
39 Lawsuits against emitters are increasing in frequency and gaining more traction in the courts. See, 
e.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP, 388 F. Supp 3d 538 (2019), cert. granted, 141 S. 
Ct. 222 (2020); Conservation Law Foundation v. ExxonMobil, No. 1:16-cv-11950-MLW Dkt. 29, 
(D. Mass. Sep. 13, 2017) (ruling that environmental group has sufficient standing to proceed with 
suit claiming that Exxon left its oil storage facilities vulnerable to flooding, despite its knowledge 
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Many leaders in the financial sector have voiced their concern that industry’s 
current assessment of these risks is woefully inadequate. Hank Paulson, former U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury and CEO of Goldman Sachs, wrote in a McKinsey 
newsletter in 2015: “As someone who has spent a good deal of time assessing risk 
and dealing with crises, I’m struck by the similarities between the climate crisis and 
the financial crisis of 2008.”40 The world’s largest asset management company, 
BlackRock, agreed:  
Many equity investors ignore climate risk, and credit investors and 
ratings agencies do not routinely assess it. Real estate markets often 
ignore extreme weather risk, even in highly exposed coastal areas. 
Most asset owners do not measure their exposure to potentially 
stranded assets such as high-cost fossil fuel reserves that may have 
to be written off if their use is impaired by climate change 
regulation. Who can blame them? There is little evidence that assets 
more susceptible to climate change and related regulatory risks trade 
at a discount to the market.41 
In the six years since these statements were made, each of these actors—equity 
analysts, ratings agencies, asset owners, and corporate managers—have made slow 
progress toward integrating climate change into analyses of financial risks.42 
Evaluating climate risk involves forecasting macroeconomic energy demand, 
guessing on the success of carbon regulation and future technologies, modeling the 
relationship between atmospheric gas concentrations and global temperatures, 
predicting how temperature rise will change the earth’s climate systems, and 
calculating how those changes impact physical economic assets. The task requires 
skills beyond that of a typical financial analyst, colossal amounts of data, and 
 
 
of climate change); Rebecca Hersher, Supreme Court Considers Baltimore Suit Against Oil 
Companies Over Climate Change, NPR (Jan. 19, 2021), 
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/19/956005206/supreme-court-considers-baltimore-suit-against-oil-
companies (reporting that there have been more than 20 cases filed by state and local governments 
against fossil companies in recent years); See generally Michael Burger et al., The Law and Science 
of Climate Change Attribution, 45 COLUMBIA J. OF ENV’T L. 57 (2020) (discussing the state of 
attribution science and how it can lead to courts to imposing liability for climate change harms). 
40 Paulson, supra, note X. 
41 BlackRock, The Price of Climate Change, supra note x.  
42 Hana V. Vizcarra, The Reasonable Investor and Climate-Related Information: Changing 
Expectations for Financial Disclosures, 50 ENV’L LAW REP. 10,106, 10,110 (2020) (“In 2019, 
Moody’s acquired climate data and risk analysis company Four Twenty Seven, Inc., and MSCI 
acquired Carbon Delta. Further, S&P Global Ratings launched the ESG Evaluation program and 
ESG Risk Atlas designed to inform investors and companies of risks, including that of climate 
change. In 2017, Institutional Shareholder Services acquired the investment climate data division of 
the South Pole Group.”). 
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models that have only begun to be built. Each step of estimation adds layers of 
uncertainty to risk projections. In some cases, particularly those longer-term and 
macroeconomic, the estimation of the economic impact of climate change may be 
dwarfed by this uncertainty.43 However, this Article focuses on climate risks at the 
scale of individual corporations and investors and their horizons. It argues that the 
market is neglecting to respond to foreseeable risks.  
A. EVIDENCE OF MISVALUATION 
 
Evidence that the market is currently under-assessing climate risks comes in 
several forms. There are recent attempts by large institutional market actors to 
model the impact of carbon regulation and climate damages onto a representative 
market portfolio. There are also a handful of empirical studies examining how well 
the market has priced the climate-related impacts we have already been 
experiencing. Added to these relatively scarce forward-looking and backward-
looking studies, are abundant anecdotal examples of market actors failing to 
prepare for climate impacts.  
In April 2019, the world’s largest asset manager, BlackRock released its 
investigation into the pricing of physical climate risks in three different categories 
of investments: municipal bonds, commercial real estate, and equities of electric 
utilities.44 The research was conducted alongside the climate-risk consultant 
Rhodium Group, and concluded that for each investment type, the market was 
failing to price asset exposure to the predictable increase in severe weather events 
and rising seas.45 In the case of municipal bonds, the report pointed out that declines 
in crop yields from increased temperatures could be expected to depress the GDP 
of many metropolitan areas by multiple percentage points.46 Given cumulative 
damage impacts, BlackRock predicts that “within a decade, more than 15% of the 
current S&P National Municipal Bond Index (by market value) would be issued by 
[metropolitan areas] suffering likely average annualized economics losses of up to 
0.5% to 1% of GDP.”47 Nevertheless, when these climate-sensitive bonds are 
compared to bonds issued by less climate-vulnerable areas, their valuations do not 
 
 
43 THE GREEN SWAN, supra note X, at 3; Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the 
Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. OF ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2009); Martin L. 
Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. 
OENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2011)). Uncertainty is discussed further infra at X. 
44 BLACKROCK, GETTING PHYSICAL: SCENARIO ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSING CLIMATE-RELATED 
RISKS 1 (April 2019). 
45 Id. at 3.  
46 Id. at 10. 
47 Id. 
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reflect this difference in risk.48 In the case of utility companies, it was found that 
the equities of more climate-resistant utilities are in fact already trading at a slight 
premium relative to more vulnerable assets, but that this price difference did not 
yet reflect the total risk exposure.49 Similarly, the International Monetary Fund 
found that present market-implied equity risk premiums are consistently lower than 
premiums calculated via an asset pricing model that takes temperature-induced 
disaster risk into account.50 It concluded that the discrepancy suggests “that equity 
markets may not currently price [physical] climate change risk.”51 
In an assessment that considered transition risks in addition to physical risks, 
the institutional investment advisor, Mercer, modeled how various assets and 
industries within a typical portfolio will be impacted under three different warming 
scenarios: where the world acts to limit warming by 2100 to 2°C, 3°C, or 4°C.52 
For each scenario, Mercer estimated the portfolio impacts at three different points 
in the future, in the years 2030, 2050, and 2100. In a 2°C scenario, which models a 
world with aggressive regulation of emissions that reaches net zero emissions by 
2070, certain sectors suffer a severe decline in returns in the short term.53 Assets in 
the oil and gas industry, for example, lose 42.1% of their value by 2030.54 In the 
3°C and 4°C scenarios, all sectors other than renewables have negative return 
impacts to both 2030 and 2050, with annual losses varying from 0.1% to 7.7%.55  
Substantial warming has already occurred—around 1.1°C as compared to 
preindustrial levels.56 The earth’s planetary systems have reacted to this warming 
in manifest and measurable ways, making the economic impacts of climate change 
a matter of the present, not just the distant future. A growing number of empirical 





50 Climate Change: Physical Risk and Equity Risk in INT. MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: MARKETS IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 (2020), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2020/04/14/global-financial-stability-report-
april-2020#Chapter5. 
51 Physical Risk and Equity Prices-Online Boxes 5.1-5.3, 4 in INT. MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY: MARKETS IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 (2020), https://www.imf.org/-
/media/Files/Publications/GFSR/2020/April/English/onlinebox51.ashx. 
52 MERCER, INVESTING IN A TIME OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE SEQUEL 8 (2019). 
53 Id. at 34. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 35. 
56 Richard J. Millar et al., Emission Budgets and Pathways Consistent with Limiting Warming to 
1.5°C, 10 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 741 (Sept. 2017) (calculating warming since preindustrial to be 0.9 
C); cf. Andrew P. Schurer et al., Importance of the pre-industrial baseline for likelihood of 
exceeding Paris goals, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 563 (2017) (calculating warming since 
preindustrial times to be 1.2 C).  
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One recent study of publicly traded food companies in 31 countries found that the 
market did not efficiently incorporate drought trend impacts on profits into stock 
prices, and estimated the mispricing to be as much as 7%.57 Another looked at the 
growing frequency of extreme temperature events from 1995 to 2017, and found 
that high temperatures reduce revenues and operating incomes of individual 
firms.58 Further, the greater the heat exposure, the greater equity analysts’ estimates 
deviate from actual financial performance.59 The authors conclude from their 
findings that “investors do not anticipate the repercussions of heat as a first-order 
physical climate risk.”60 The climate data firm 427 generates physical climate risk 
scores for individual firms based on their exposure to operational disruption risk.61 
A recent paper shows that a trading strategy employing 427’s heat stress factor over 
the period from 2008-2018 – by selling high risk firms and buying low risk firms – 
would have generated returns of 77%.62  
 
 
57 Harrison G. Hong, Frank Weikai Li & Jiangmin Xu, Climate Risks and Market Efficiency, 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS (forthcoming Sept. 2017); see also Mathias Kruttli, Brigette Roth Tran, 
& Sumudu Watugala, Pricing Poseidon: Extreme Weather Uncertainty and Firm Return Dynamics, 
(EBRD Working Paper No. 229, 2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3451323 (analyzing volatility risk premia 
changes due to hurricanes and finding that investors significantly underestimate the uncertainty 
associated with hurricanes, but that the underreaction became less pronounced after Hurricane 
Sandy). 
58 Nora Pankratz, Rob Bauer & Jeroen Derwall, Climate Change, Firm Performance, and Investor 
Surprises, (European Center for Sustainable Finance, Working Paper 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3443146. 
59 Id. 
60 Id.; see also Alok Kumar, Wei Xin & Chendi Zhang, Climate Sensitivity and Predictably Returns 
(Working Paper 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3331872 (similarly 
finding that extreme temperature anomalies negatively affect stock returns and concluding that 
markets underreact to firms’ climate sensitivities); see also Jawad Addoum, David Ng & Ariel Ortiz-
Bobea, Temperature Shocks and Industry Earnings News, (2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3480695 (showing that quarterly earnings of 
firms in certain industries are negatively affected by extreme heat waves and that analysts’ forecasts 
did not fully account for this impact in their earnings forecasts). 
61 See generally FOUR TWENTY SEVEN, https://427mt.com/ (last visited Jan 30., 2021). 
62 Glen Gostlow, Pricing Climate Risk (London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Working Paper 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3501013 (importantly, 
the paper notes that these returns may be attributed either to mispricing or to compensation for risk, 
and that further study is needed); see also Ruihong Jiang & Chengguo Weng, Climate Change Risk 
and Agriculture Related Stocks (2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3506311&download=yes; Mats Andersson, 
Patrick Bolton & Frédéric Samama, Hedging Climate Risk, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL 7 
(2016) (employing the Actuaries Climate Index to test for the impact of physical climate risk on 
agriculture related stock returns and similarly finding that that a strategy of buying and selling based 
on climate risk scores would have generated positive returns). 
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Evidence suggests that the housing market has begun to price in the risks of sea 
level rise, but that the risk is still undervalued.63 There are reasons to expect these 
risks to be ignored in this market in particular, despite the fact that more than 
300,000 coastal homes are at risk of chronic inundation by the year 2045—within 
the lifespan of a 30-year mortgage issued today.64 For one, flood maps made by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are out of date and fail to 
capture current flood risks, let alone projected flooding from sea level rise.65 This 
means that highly exposed homes are being covered by government insurance at 
heavily subsidized rates.66 For another, there is no legal requirement to disclose 
flood history when selling a home. And Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s governing 
regulations prohibit them from factoring natural disaster risk into their pricing of 
mortgages bought from banks.67  
Investors can only price the risks that they are aware of, and increasing attention 
has been paid to the lack of climate-related risk disclosure, leaving investors in the 
dark. There is a large gap between the economy-wide estimates of the impact of 
climate change in the financial sector (ranging broadly from $4.2 to $43 trillion68), 
 
 
63 Markus Baldauf, Lorenzo Garlappi & Constantine Yannelis, Does Climate Change Affect Real 
Estate Prices? Only if You Believe in It, REV. FIN. STUDIES (forthcoming Sept. 2019) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3240200) (finding that homes vulnerable to 
sea level rise are priced at a discount only in those neighborhoods where residents largely believe 
in the existence of climate change) cf. Asaf Bernstein, Matthew Gustafson & Ryan Lewis, Disaster 
on the Horizon: The Price Effect of Sea Level Rise, J. FIN. ECON (forthcoming) (finding that coastal 
homes vulnerable to sea level rise are priced at a 6.6% discount relative to similar homes at higher 
elevations, and concluding that the market must either not fully believe in SLR projections or expect 
that cheap mitigation infrastructure will be available and installed to protect against property 
damage); Justin Murfin & Matthew Spiegel, Is the Risk of Sea Level Capitalized in Residential Real 
Estate?, 33 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 1217 (2020) (finding valuation impact that “would arise 
from an unmitigated 0.27 mm/year average relative sea level rise under 10% discount rates, an order 
of magnitude lower than the 2.8 mm/year experienced in recent history,” indicating significant 
underpricing of risk); Stefano Giglio, Matteo Maggiori, Krichna Rao, Johannes Stroebel & Andreas 
Weber, Climate Change and Long-Run Discount Rates: Evidence from Real Estate (Chicago Booth, 
Working Paper No. 17-22, 2018). 
64 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UNDERWATER: RISING SEAS, CHRONIC FLOODS, AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR US COASTAL REAL ESTATE, 2 (2018). 
65 Kate Duguid, Citing climate risk, investors bet against mortgage market, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 
2019); Jen Schwartz, National Flood Insurance Is Underwater Because of Outdated Science, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Mar. 23, 2018). 
66 Id. 
67 Christopher Flavelle, Climate Risk in the Housing Market Has Echoes of Subprime Crisis, Study 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), reporting on Amine Ouazad & Matthew Kahn, Mortgage 
Finance in the Face of Rising Climate Risk (NBER Working Paper No. 26322 Sept. 30, 2019).  
68 THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE COST OF INACTION: RECOGNISING THE VALUE AT RISK 
FROM CLIMATE CHANGE (2015) (reporting $43 trillion loss at high end of loss estimates, under 6C 
of warming, which current consensus suggests we will not reach anytime in the next century).  
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and the cumulative impacts disclosed by individual companies in their financial 
reporting. One recent study found that the total value of aggregated financial risk 
reported through both voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosures amounted to 
mere tens of billions of dollars of potential negative impact—at least two orders of 
magnitude smaller than top-down projections of costs to financial assets.69 In the 
next 15 years alone, publicly traded corporations can expect to face about $3 trillion 
in climate-related losses according to a study conducted by the UN Finance 
Initiative in partnership with 20 large investment funds.70  
One recent example of this under-assessed and undisclosed climate risk comes 
from the California wildfires. In 2018, Pacific Gas and Electric voluntarily 
disclosed its climate-related risks to the nonprofit CDP (formerly the Carbon 
Disclosure Project).71 The company highlighted climate change driven increases in 
wildfire risk as a potential liability, and estimated its 2017 claim payouts at $2.5 
billion.72 Any investor that relied on this information to be a fair predictor of future 
liability would be deeply disappointed in January 2019 when PG&E announced it 
was filing for bankruptcy and facing $30 billion in wildfire liabilities.73 PG&E’s 
share price fell more than 80% in two months.74  
Expected damages from the changing climate extend far more broadly across 
the economy than mainstream financial news coverage might suggest to the average 
investor. With warmer days, labor productivity declines, the rate of infectious 
diseases increases, energy transmission becomes less efficient, wasps nests the size 
of cars become more common.75 And yet when voluntarily disclosing their 
environmental risks to CDP, more than 1,000 U.S. manufacturing companies report 
 
 
69 Allie Goldstein, Will Turner, Jillian Gladstone & David Hole, The Private Sector’s Climate 
Change Risk and Adaptation Blind Spots, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 18 (2019). 
70 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME FINANCE INITIATIVE, CHANGING COURSE 51 
(2019) (modeling a market portfolio of 30,000 companies and calculating value at risk, using a 15 
year horizon under a scenario where warming is limited to 2°).  




%2Fft9rgfbw%2F11971&survey_id=58150509 (last visited Jan. 20, 2021). 
72 Brad Plumer, Companies See Climate Change Hitting Their Bottom Lines in the Next 5 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019); PG&E Corporation – Climate Change 2018, supra note X. 
73 Russell Gold, PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not the Last, THE WALL 
STREET J. (Jan. 18, 2019), wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-the-first-climate-change-
bankruptcy-11547820006. 
74 Id.  
75 Mariel Padilla, Officials Warn of Wasp ‘Super Nests’ in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2019). 
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they anticipate no climate related risks.76 The Brookings Institution recently found 
that communities exposed to heightened physical risk fail to report that risk in their 
municipal bond disclosures.77  
 
B. DRIVERS OF MISPRICING  
 
An array of financial regulators share the conclusion that financial markets are 
failing to price climate risks, and this conclusion is supported by the growing 
number of empirical and model-based studies discussed in the preceding section. 
Yet, as critics of “sustainability” investing point out, this conclusion appears at odds 
with the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), which suggests that all 
known, or knowable, financial risks are already priced into the market.78 This next 
section outlines the drivers of this mispricing, breaking them into six discrete 
categories: (1) Lack of asset-level data; (2) Model risk and latent risk; (3) 
Misaligned incentives of corporate leadership; (4) Myopic shareholders and market 
structure; (5) Misinformation and biases; and (6) Political opposition and regulatory 
capture.  
This Article argues that in some cases the market is mispricing risks that are 
already known, or could be known with present research methods and publicly 
available data. In other cases, the data need is unavailable to the market and kept 
internal to the corporation.  
 
1. Lack of Asset-Level Data  
 
Shareholders and analysts currently lack the fine-grained asset level data they 
need in order to make climate-risk assessments.79 Where corporate operations are 
 
 
76 CDP, MAJOR RISK OR ROSY OPPORTUNITY (2019) (showing that 1041 manufacturing companies 
report no climate related risk (as compared to 300 reporting physical risks, 326 reporting transition 
risks, and 472 reporting both)). 
77 Parker Bolstad et al., Flying Blind: What Do Investors Really Know about Climate Change Risks 
in the U.S. Equity and Municipal Debt Markets? (Hutchins Center, Working Paper No. 67, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/WP67_Victor-et-al.pdf. 
78 Brest, Gilson, Gordon supra; Opinion, Labor vs. the ESG Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2020) 
(criticizing Larry Fink’s BlackRock for assuming markets don’t account for political risks like 
climate regulation and arguing that alleged “material” risks are “not clearly linked to financial 
performance”). 
79 NGFS, CALL FOR ACTION supra note X at 30 (“In the course of its work, the NGFS observed, like 
other institutions and academic papers before, that data scarcity and inconsistency are substantial 
obstacles to the development of analytical work on climate risk.”); see generally WORLD BANK & 
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, SPATIAL FINANCE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN A CHANGING 
WORLD EFI INSIGHT-FINANCE (2020).  
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located, the origins and routes of their supply chains, the sources and quantities of 
inputs like water and energy – this is the type of information needed to assess 
climate risk exposure but is not the type of information currently disclosed in 
financial reports.80 Many climate risks are local in nature, so assets must be 
evaluated geospatially.81 Often, however, the climate risk related information that 
companies voluntarily disclose aggregates data at the parent or holding-company 
level and does not disclose information specific to subsidiaries or particular 
assets.82 Corporate reporting of climate risks are far more likely to come in a 
qualitative, descriptive form than a quantitative one.83 And their assessment of risks 
occur at widely varying time-scales.84 Further, many current models of climate risk 
fail to differentiate well between exposure and liability.85 They may be able to 
describe that an asset is in a floodplain and exposed to hurricane risk, but they don’t 
assess how resilient the asset will be to a hurricane. Have the operators of the asset 
made investments in climate adaption already? Is the asset relatively 
invulnerable?86 More resilient than industry peers?  
While companies have access to information regarding their own assets, they 
may be exposed to significant supply chain risk. This risk may be impossible to 
evaluate without disclosure of the location and resilience of the facilities of 
suppliers and distributors.87 Corporations may rely on key infrastructure, like roads 
 
 
80 CFTC REPORT 58  (“Some financial institutions may have asset-level data to overlay with physical 
risk data, for example, a bank providing project finance loans. However, most finance use cases will 
not have direct access to asset-level data for counterparty analysis, let alone analysis of multiple 
counterparties in a portfolio (such as a listed equities portfolio)”); DEUTSCHE ASSET MANAGEMENT, 
MEASURING PHYSICAL CLIMATE RISKS IN EQUITY PORTFOLIOS 2 (2017) (“To do so, investors first 
need to identify the physical locations of the companies they invest in, a task made tricky by the 
generally poor corporate disclosure around these topics.”) 
81 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, CLIMATE RISK AND RESPONSE, PHYSICAL HAZARDS AND 
SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS 7 (2020). 
82 State of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceeding in the Matter Regarding the Need 
for Reporting Risks Related to Climate Change, No. 20-M-0499 at 3 (Oct. 15, 2020), 
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B0FFF1374-0511-
41AC-8262-56BED5FAC8CC%7D. 
83 Goldstein et al. supra note X at X; Bolstad et al., supra note X at 11 (reporting only 2% financial 
reports from the world’s largest 250 firms quantified climate risks and only 3% “discuss if or how 
they use scenarios analysis to model risk”). 
84 Id. 
85 Asset-level data conference; CFTC REPORT, supra note XX, at 58 (“While an ecosystem of 
climate data is emerging, much of the advances in measuring and evaluating asset exposure have 
not been accompanied by corresponding advances in evaluating the sensitivity of exposed assets or 
the adaptive capacity of firms to manage sensitivity and exposure.”) 
86 Example of desalination plants, asset-level data conference 
87 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note X, at 32. 
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and water utilities, that have unaddressed climate risk exposure, yet have operators 
who lack the resources or the mandate to even evaluate it.88  
2. Outdated Means of Risk Assessment: Model Risk, Latent Risk, and Duration 
Mismatch  
 
The traditional methods by which market actors assess risk may be particularly 
prone to failure in a climate-changed world. Financial models, including those 
impacting capital-allocation decisions within corporations, often rely on historical 
data to make future projections of risk.89 In the climate context, the future will look 
very different from the past in myriad ways. Historical data representing a relatively 
stable climate past cannot be relied upon to predict future risks.90 Future expected 
risk has to be creatively modeled – a challenge given uncertainties regarding 
emissions levels, future regulation, changes to the earth’s systems, and 
socioeconomic feedbacks.91 The failure to adjust risk assessment methods for 
corporate decisions like crop selection, or the location and resilience of 
infrastructure, is one example of model risk.92 
 
 
88 Sarah Whateley, Jeffrey Walker & Casey Brown, A Web-Based Screening Model for Climate Risk 
to Water Supply Systems in the Northeastern United States, 73 ENV. MODELLING SOFTWARE 64 
(2015) (describing that “small-scale [privately owned] water utilities in the northeastern United 
States that may lack the resources for detailed climate change risk investigations”). 
89 Patrick Temple-West, When Climate Change Threat To Weather Needs a Stilted Response, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/80547020-bdbf-11e9-9381-78bab8a70848; 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note X, at 114 (“reliance on historical data or ‘worst case’ 
expectations based on experience to relying on climate modeling tools to prepare for the future, 
including building new analytics capabilities”); see also Colin Raymond et al., Understanding and 
Managing Connected Extreme Events, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 611-621 (2020). 
90 Bolton et al., THE GREEN SWAN, CENTRAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE AGE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE, BANQUE DE FRANCE 21 (2020). 
91 While a challenge, insurance companies and other firms are increasingly turning to specialized 
private providers of climate forecasts, like Jupiter Intelligence. See Mary Franklin Harvin, How 
Climate Prediction Tech is Reshaping the Insurance Industry, KQED (Nov. 29, 2019), 
https://www.kqed.org/news/11788645/how-climate-prediction-tech-is-reshaping-the-insurance-
industry. 
92 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note X, at 31. Firm managers make decisions about how to 
allocate their companies’ capital to future investment projects by evaluating the expected future 
returns of these projects. To do this, they must account for how risky the project is, but current 
mainstream financial methods of evaluating this risk are not well-adapted to a future of climate 
extremes. The most common method used for assessing a potential investment is to calculate its net 
present value by summing all expected future returns over the lifetime of the project and discounting 
them by the risk-free rate (which represents the time-value of money) and a risk-premium, meant to 
account for riskiness of the project. This risk premium is rarely assessed by forward looking asset-
specific analysis of risk, and instead is typically captured by backward-looking measures of past 
risk, often assessed at the company (rather than asset) level. See Mohsen Taheri, Mehdi Irannajad 
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Another classic model risk associated with climate change is failure to capture 
extreme unprecedented events. For example, one standard measure that portfolio 
managers use to estimate potential losses is value at risk (VaR). VaR provides a 
level of confidence, such as 95 or 99%, that an expected loss will fall within a 
certain range. But VaR says nothing about the potential magnitude of loss for the 
extreme event that has a 1% chance of occurring. Given that certain climate risks 
are highly uncertain, and potentially catastrophic, they may lie in this 1% zone that 
is likely to be discounted by market actors as “unlikely.”93 This “fat-tail risk” 
deviates from the normal distribution that market actors may be accustomed to rely 
on in their models.94 
A further potential for model risk comes from misjudging not only the increased 
frequency and severity of extreme climate events, but also their correlation.95 Large 
multinationals, like PepsiCo, have operations located around the globe and their 
size may factor into their traditional approach to risk management: it has been 
historically unlikely that a hurricane will hit operations in Brazil, Florida, and India 
 
 
& Majid Ataee-Pour, Risk-adjusted Discount Rate Estimation for Evaluating Mining Projects, 4 
FINSIA J. APPLIED FIN. 36, 36 (2009) (describing CAPM as the “main method” for estimating the 
risk adjusted discount rate for mining projects). For example, one common method of approximating 
the appropriate risk premium is to calculate the cost of capital of similar firms in the same industry 
relative to the market. This calculation is often done using long term averages of the firms’ stock 
prices. Kahan, Securities Laws, supra note X at X. In a world of climate change, however, past risk 
is no longer representative of future expected risk. Approximating a risk premium that accounts for 
expected climate risk is more challenging, as it requires more information than historical financial 
data. See, e.g., M. Onischka, Environmental and climate risks in financial analysis, 108 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND INVESTMENT ASSESSMENT II 75 (2008). 
93 THE GREEN SWAN, supra note X at 21 (“Moreover, climate-related risks typically fit fat-tailed 
distributions and concentrate precisely in the 1% not considered by VaR.”); see also Raymond et 
al., supra note X. 
94 VIVIAN DÉPOUES ET AL., TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH IN FINANCE TO CLIMATE RISKS: 
TAKING UNCERTAINTIES FULLY INTO ACCOUNT, INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE ECONOMICS 6 (2019) 
(pointing out that "traditional approaches to risk management in the banking sector" rely on 
“historical data and on assumptions of normal distributions”); see also Yesha Yadav, How 
Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1619, 1653 
(noting that “An estimated 70% of trading that occurs in the market is algorithmic or “quant” trading 
and these trades are based on models programmed to guess where the price will go in the relative 
short-term typically relying on backward-looking historical data. These models are “particularly 
prone to fail when confronted by new and abnormal events.”… “Catastrophes are difficult and costly 
to include in programming.”). 
95 Cf. Gilson & Kraakman Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis at 343-44 (discussing how 
valuation models employed by banks and ratings agencies failed because they relied on historical 
housing price data to model future risk and ignored warnings of high unaccounted-for correlations 
between assets) 
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in the same season.96 Due to climate-change, these physical risks may cluster in 
time and correlate across geographies in new and unanticipated ways.97 Recent 
studies, for example, have highlighted the increasing, yet still largely unanticipated, 
chance for simultaneous temperature and weather-induced crop failures in key 
breadbaskets around the world.98 Lael Brainard, Board Member of the Governing 
Board of the Federal Reserve, has noted this potential for unforeseen climate risk 
correlation and its resemblance to the 2008 mortgage crisis.99 
Additionally, traditional means of risk assessment may ignore latent risks: The 
entire capital stock of corporate America was built using engineering specifications 
designed to endure certain temperature and weather extremes that may be regularly 
exceeded in a climate-changed world.100 A facility that was built to withstand a 
“100-year flood” may now have a much higher likelihood of failure.101 Tens of 
thousands of steel bridges in the U.S., for example, were built relying on design 
specifications for expansion and contraction based on estimated temperature 
 
 
96 See, e.g., CFTC REPORT, supra note XX, at 33 (“Research suggests that bigger banks may be 
better able to offset temporary regional losses from natural disasters with earnings from other 
regions” (citing John Landon-Lane et al., The Economics of Climate Change: Adaptations Past and 
Present: Droughts, Floods and Financial Distress in the United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 15596, 2011))). 
97 See e.g., Luc Bonnafous, Upmanu Lall & Jason Siegel, An Index for Drought Induced Financial 
Risk in the Mining Industry, 53 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1509-24 (2017) (showing that “spatial and 
temporal correlation in the frequency of climate extremes leads to tail portfolio risk that may… be 
substantially greater than expected from treating each asset as an independent exposure”); John 
Schwartz, ‘Like a Terror Movie’: How Climate Change Will Cause More Simultaneous Disasters, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/climate/climate-disasters.html 
(citing Camilo Mora et al., Broad Threat to Humanity from Cumulative Climate Hazards Intensified 
by Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1062-1071 (2018), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0315-6). 
98 Andrew Freedman, Extreme Weather Patterns Are Raising the Risk of a Global Food Crisis, and 
Climate Change Will Make This Worse, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2019) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2019/12/09/extreme-weather-patterns-are-raising-risk-
global-food-crisis-climate-change-will-make-this-worse (citing Kai Kornhuber et al., Amplified 
Rossby Waves Enhance Risk of Concurrent Heatwaves in Major Breadbasket Regions, 10 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 48 (2020); Franziska Gaupp et al., Changing Risks of Simultaneous Global 
Breadbasket Failure, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 54 (2020)). 
99 Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Address at the Fed. Res. Bank 
of San Francisco’s The Economics of Climate Change Research Conference: Why Climate Change 
Matters for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability (Nov. 8, 2019). 
100 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note X at 64. 
101 See, e.g., Reza Marsooli et al., Climate Change Exacerbates Hurricane Flood Hazards Along 
US Atlantic and Gulf Coasts in Spatially Varying Patterns, NATURE COMMUNICATIONS (2019) 
(finding that “100-year” flood events on the east coast will increase in frequency, to as much as 
annually or once every 30-years, depending on the region).  
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extremes that are now expected to be surpassed.102 The businesses (and their 
shareholders) whose supply chains rely on these bridges are likely unaware of their 
heightened risk exposure. Climate change exacerbates the already fragile state of 
America’s aging infrastructure: more than 15 thousand dams (a majority of which 
are privately owned) have a “high-hazard” potential and 9-25% of bridges are 
“structurally deficient” without any consideration of climate impacts.103 
Finally, some corporate managers, especially of mid-sized or smaller firms, are 
accustomed to relying on third-party insurance products to assess and price their 
company’s risk exposure, rather than internal statistical risk management.104 But 
insurance premiums are typically re-assessed and paid on an annual basis.105 In a 
world of non-linear climate responses, the price of insurance may dramatically 
skyrocket from one year to the next, and certain assets may become uninsurable 
altogether.106 Relying on insurance to price risks of investments that are expected 
to reap returns decades into the future, leads to a “duration mismatch”107 that may 
leave these assets stranded without insurance, leading to unrecoverable losses in 
the event of a disaster.108  




102 Susan Palu & Hussam Mahmoud, Impact of Climate Change on the Integrity of the 
Superstructure of Deteriorated US Bridges, 14 PLOSONE (Oct. 2019); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 
(July 2013). 
103 AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 27 (2017) (listing 9.1% of 
bridges as structurally deficient). According to the GAO the figure is more like 25%. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE: INFORMATION ON BRIDGE 
CONDITIONS (2015). 
104 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 126 (pointing out that “statistical risk 
management is often not part of ordinary processes in industrial companies”). 
105 TCFD 2019 STATUS REPORT, citing SWISS RE, 2018 FINANCIAL REPORT 177 (2018) (“Since most 
of the re/insurance contracts with our clients have a duration of one year, we can thus adequately 
price natural catastrophe risks by updating our models to reflect the current climate.”). 
106 Jessica Shankleman, Growing Climate Risks May Be ‘Impossible to Model’ – and Ultimately 
Uninsurable, INSURANCE J. (Nov. 13, 2017). 
107 The term duration mismatch typically refers to when a company’s liabilities are not closely linked 
in time with its assets United States. See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT 
REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S EXIT STRATEGY 
(2010). 
108 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, supra note 59, at 46; see also Mark Carney, et al., Transition in 
Thinking: The Impact of Climate Change on the UK Banking Sector, BANK OF ENGLAND 
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY (Sept. 2018) (arguing that while banks are aware that flood 
risk will increase, few have modelled effects on insurance premia of increased flood risk). 
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Corporate managers have access to their firms’ operational data, and are likely 
better positioned, as compared to their shareholders, to assess their firms’ resilience 
to climate change. They may, however, lack personal incentives for seeking out and 
assessing climate risk, let alone disclosing potential risk exposures to the market.109 
The revelation that a firm is exposed to previously unaccounted for climate risks 
may lead to a fall in share price, which managers are trained, and incentivized, to 
avoid.110 In some cases, adapting to climate change requires up-front capital 
expenditures in order to stave off longer-term losses—like the raising or relocation 
of facilities. But managers that manage to a stock-price set by a myopic market are 
discouraged from making these investments in the short term.111  
The reasons why managers may focus on keeping stock price high in the short 
term, even if that means sacrificing longer term fundamental value, have been well 
explored in the literature. A drop in stock price may open up a manager to the risk 
of being fired,112 so in the interest of self-preservation she may focus on the 
demands of myopic shareholders while neglecting to spend resources assessing and 
mitigating longer term risks to the company.113 Further, executive remuneration is 
regularly linked with short-term metrics of firm performance, including through 
compensation in stock, or stock options.114 Evidence suggests that the shorter the 
time CEOs have to wait before their options vest, the more likely they are to cut 
investment budgets, personally profiting from the market’s interpretation of short-
term increases in earnings.115 Armour, Gordon, and Min show how options 
 
 
109 See, e.g., Armour, Gordon & Min, supra note X at 26-31 (arguing that stock-based, including 
options-based, executive compensation models incentivize corporate managers to neglect risk 
management programs, to the detriment of the long-term value of the stock). 
110 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Watcher, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 653, 710-711 (2010).  
111 Armour et al., supra note X at X (making analogous argument with respect to compliance 
programs, showing that up-front investment in compliance is shown on disclosed financial 
statements, while future benefits, both discounted and uncertain, are poorly reflected); LUCIAN 
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, 183-185 (Harvard Univ. Press 2006). 
112 See, e.g., Tim S. Campbell & Anthony M. Marino, Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive 
Labor Markets, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 855 (1994); Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart I Costa, 
Managerial Incentives and Capital Management, 101 Q. J. ECON. 835 (1986). 
113 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1088 (2007).  
114 See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note X; Steven N. Kaplan, CEO Pay and Corporate 
Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8 (2013). 
115 Tomislav Ladika & Zacharias Sautner, Managerial short-termism and investment: Evidence from 
accelerated option vesting, (U. of Amsterdam, Working Paper 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286789; Alex Edmans, Vivian W. Fang & 
Katharina A. Lewellen, Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia, 30 REV. FIN. STUDIES 2229 (2017). 
An oft-cited example of this effect is from a 2005 survey of corporate executives, 80 percent of 
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compensation, which becomes worthless if the stock falls below the strike price, 
mutes managers’ personal exposure to downside risk.116 Because managers are 
indifferent to the difference between a “bad” and a “worse” event, meaning they 
are likely to ignore “insurance against low-probability high-impact events.”117  
If cutting costs are not enough to meet earnings targets, managers may engage 
in “earnings management,” a euphemism for accounting manipulations such as 
shifting expenditures to later quarters, and revenues to earlier ones.118 Earnings 
manipulation is just one example of managers undertaking “signal jamming,” or 
the massaging of financial metrics used by investors to assess risk.119 The coal 
company Peabody Energy may already provide an example of such agency costs in 
the climate context. In 2016, the New York attorney general announced it had 
reached a settlement with Peabody after an investigation revealed the many ways 
the company had withheld information from investors regarding internal 
projections for future coal demand.120 While Peabody’s “disclosures denied its 
ability to reasonably predict the future impact of any climate change regulation on 
its business… the company and its consultants [internally] projected severe impacts 
from certain potential regulations that would materially affect Peabody.”121 In 
another example of potential managerial manipulation, an Exxon whistleblower 
claims the company deceptively overvalued one of its largest oil assets, and forced-
out employees who objected to the figure as unrealistic.122 
Equity-overvaluation can drive managers to preference short-term performance 
metrics over long term value-creation in an effort to meet market expectations.123 
 
 
whom admitted that they felt pressure to decrease spending in areas like research and development 
in order to meet quarterly earnings targets. John R. Graham, Campbell Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, 
The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 32-35 
(2005). 
116 Armour, supra note X, at 20, 25. 
117 Id. at 25. 
118 Dallas, supra note X at 312. 
119 Id.; Michael C. Jensen, Paying People to Lie: The Truth About the Budgeting Process, 9 EUR. 
FIN. MGMT. 379, 387 (2003). 
120 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Secures Unprecedented 
Agreement with Peabody Energy to End Misleading Statements and Disclose Risks Arising From 
Climate Change (Nov. 9, 2015). 
121 Clifford Krauss, Peabody Energy Agrees to Greater Disclosures of Financial Risks N.Y. TIMES 




122 Christopher Matthews & Emily Glazer, Exxon Draws SEC Prove Over Permian Basin Asset 
Valuation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2021). 
123 See Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA 
L. REV. 277, 335 (1990) (“There will be an especial tendency to overinvest with respect to those 
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Michael Jensen has argued that in order to live up to the expectations of an over-
valued stock price, managers spend money on schemes that destroy long run value 
but “mask the inherent uncertainty in their businesses.”124 In his model, executives 
sometimes spend money on investments that are not net-present-value justified, just 
to keep up the appearance of growth and the promise of future profits.125 This 
“overvaluation trap,” it has been argued, describes the decisions of oil executives 
to spend hundreds of billions of dollars, each year, on prospecting for new reserves, 
despite there being a 53 year supply of oil contained in the world’s existing 2 trillion 
barrels of reserves.126 Oil companies derive most of their net present value from the 
future promised profitability of their reserves.127 Any acknowledgement on the part 
of executives that these reserves may, in fact, not be worth bringing to the surface 
in a future world with stricter climate regulation and more competition from 
renewables, will lead to a decline in stock price. (In 2004, under pressure from 
regulators, Shell downwardly adjusted its estimated proven reserves by 20%, and 
share prices fell 10%).128 The practice of fossil fuel companies continuing to predict 
future cash flows from reserves that will likely be left undeveloped in a climate 
sensitive world, is consistent with these practices.129  
Some industries have adapted their compensation structures to counteract the 
underinvestment pressure of short-termism, but these metrics may incentivize the 
wrong kind of long-term goals, reinforcing mispricing. In the fossil fuel industry, 
for example, many companies have policies that tie executive bonuses to the 
“reserves replacement ratio,” meaning the amount of reserves added relative to the 
 
 
unusual investment projects which generate large negative cash flows in the long term. The manager 
might not care as much about the costs which arise after he retires or leaves the firm. He might not 
care [for example] about the restoration expenditures after strip mining…”). 
124 Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, supra note X at 7. 
125 Id.; see also Kahan, supra note X at 1030-31 (describing a managers attempt to “adapt” to a 
market misvaluation by pursuing strategies that result in overvaluation even though “pursuing 
business plans favored by the market even if they are not profitable . . . is obviously undesirable.”). 
Under this view, stock buybacks, rather than inflating shares, makes them fall, as investors interpret 
buybacks as a signal that the company does not have anything better to spend the money on. 
126 Roger Martin & Alison Kemper, The Overvaluation Trap, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2015). 
127  Analysis from McKinsey and the Carbon Trust has shown that more than half of oil and gas 
companies’ valuation is based on anticipated cash flows more than ten years in the future. CARBON 
TRUST, CLIMATE CHANGE – A BUSINESS REVOLUTION? 13 (2008). 
128 John Carey, Shell: The Case of the Missing Oil, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Jan. 26, 2004) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2004-01-25/shell-the-case-of-the-missing-oil. 
129 CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, MEASURING COMMITMENT TO CLIMATE GOALS (2019), 
(identifying $50 billion of investment since 2018 in major fossil projects that undermine climate 
targets and warning that oil and gas companies risk wasting $2.2 trillion by 2030 if they base 
investment decisions on current emissions policies announced by governments). 
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amount extracted that year.130 This metric, along with the common practice of 
linking incentives on exploration and production, rather than revenue, creates a 
particular incentive in an industry where capital projects may not generate revenues 
for many years.131 At ExxonMobil, for example, 23% of executive pay is tied to 
metrics that directly incentivize growth in reserves and production, and another 
23% is tied to “indirect growth” metrics like earnings and cash flow.132 But these 
metrics are now out of synch in a world where long-term capital would best be 
served by not adding to likely unprofitable reserves. 
4. Market Structure Limits Shareholders Demand for Risk Assessment 
 
The ECMH rests on the assumption that the buyers and sellers in a market are 
actively seeking out relevant information on a firm’s fundamental value, in order 
to profit off of any mis-valuation.133 But the past few decades have seen innovation 
in the capital markets that suggest investors are following a different methodology 
than what we traditionally think an investor does, i.e. learning about a company to 
predict future profits and trading on that information. The corporate governance 
literature contains a voluminous debate about whether short-term focused hedge 
funds pressure corporations to be myopic, and if so, whether their longer-term 
counterparts, institutional investors like asset managers and pension funds, serve as 
 
 
130 INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, MONEY TO BURN: HOW CEO PAY IS ACCELERATING CLIMATE 
CHANGE, 13 (2015); see also ExxonMobil, 2015 Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (April 14, 
2015),  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/000119312515128602/d855824ddef14a.htm 
(citing the successful drilling of the first exploration well in the Russian Arctic as a basis for 
executive compensation decisions); ConocoPhillips, 2017 Proxy Statement, 86 (2017) (citing the 
removal of the reserves replacement ratio metric from the compensation inventive program as part 
of the company’s long term strategy for adapting to climate change); Simon Bowers & Harry 
Davies, Oil Company Bosses’ Bonuses Linked to $1tn Spending on Extracting Fossil Fuels, 
GUARDIAN (May 25, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/25/oil-company-
bosses-bonuses-1tr-spending-fossil-fuels. 
131 CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, PAYING WITH FIRE: HOW OIL AND GAS EXECUTIVES ARE 
REWARDED FOR CHASING GROWTH AND WHY SHAREHOLDERS COULD GET BURNED (2019) (finding 
that out of 40 of the largest listed oil and gas companies in the S&P Global Oil Index, 32 had growth 
incentives based on production levels, 27 linked compensation with reserves, resources, drilling 
inventor, and acreage metrics, and 24 included both).   
132 CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, GROUNDHOG PAY: HOW EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES TRAP 
COMPANIES IN A LOOP OF FOSSIL GROWTH 18 (2020) (finding that 90% of oil and gas companies 
directly reward executives for production or reserves increases in some shape or form and 
recommending that “growth neutral” metrics be used instead, such as “return on average capital 
employed”). 
133 Sanford Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 
70 AMER. ECON. R., 393 (1980). 
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a counter-acting force to this short-termism.134 But this debate has largely failed to 
grapple with another difference (besides horizon) between long-term institutional 
investors and short-term focused hedge funds and quant traders: the former are 
increasingly quasi-indexers who “passively” buy and hold baskets of assets, while 
the latter make frequent firm-specific trades. Even if institutional investors are able 
to promote long-termism through governance measures and oversight of 
management, it is still active investors trading on the margins that determines share 
price.  
While roughly 80% of the net present value of a long term investor’s portfolio 
is based on cash flows expected beyond the five year horizon, most equity analysts 
make buy or sell recommendations employing risk analyses that fall within the 
three to five year mark.135 Some of the sectors that are likely to be the most exposed 
to long-term climate risks, like utilities and real estate, have the largest percentage 
of their net present values derived from expected cash flows that extend more than 
20 years into the future.136 One recent survey asked equity analysts why there was 
such a focus on the short term, despite the fact that most equity is now held by “long 
term” investors.137 The analysts reported that disconnect was due, in part, to lack of 
demand from investors.138  
Weak investor demand for long term risk analysis may be explained, in part, by 
the rise in short-term trading.139 In 1960, the average share of stock was held for 
 
 
134 Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2015) (“Most importantly, there is no evidence that activist interventions 
produce short-term improvements in performance at the expense of long-term performance.”); Leo 
E. Strine Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund 
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1915 (2017). 
135 2 DEGREE INVESTING INITIATIVE, ALL SWANS ARE BLACK IN THE DARK: HOW THE SHORT-TERM 
FOCUS ON FINANCIAL ANALYSIS DOES NOT SHED LIGHT ON LONG TERM RISKS 5 (2017). 
136 2 DEGREE INVESTING INITIATIVE, HIT AND MISS: ABOUT TCFD DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE FOR 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 8 (2017). 
137 2 DEGREE INVESTING, ALL SWANS ARE BLACK, supra, note X at 5 (explaining that retirement 
funds and insurers have long term liabilities and are “supposed to optimize their return on a 15-30 
year horizon”). 
138 Id at 39. The other three reasons provided where, (1) lack of data, (2) sophisticated long-term 
risk assessment is expensive and (3) methodological obstacles.  
139 ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LIMITED, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SUSTAINABLE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE vi (2020); cf. Mark Roe et al., Stock Market Short-termism’s Impact 12 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper 426, 2018), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalroe.pdf (arguing that this 
assertion is flawed as it misses the fact that “shares are increasingly owned by longer-term investors, 
even while the remaining short-term investors trade increasingly frequently and thus drive up the 
average turnover rate.”) While Roe et al. are correct in their assessment of how this might affect 
corporate governance (managers are beholden to short and long term investors alike), it does not 
address how this dynamic is likely to affect myopic pricing.  
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eight years and four months.140 Current estimates of average length of share hold-
time range between four and eight months,141 with hedge fund holdings averaging 
four and a half months.142 When investors hold stock for shorter periods of time 
there is less demand for long-term risk analysis: the stock analyses are made 
considering performance projections over a much smaller window of time. The 
decision to buy or sell becomes increasingly divorced from an analysis of a stock’s 
underlying fundamentals, and based more upon “heterogeneous expectations about 
price movements.”143 Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine 
has commented that “actively traded funds turn over at a rate which makes it 
difficult to believe that their managers are basing their decisions on a genuine 
assessment of the corporations’ long-term cash flow prospects as opposed to their 
speculation about where the market is heading.”144 It has been empirically shown 
that increases in stock ownership by shorter-horizon investors is associated with 
reductions in longer-term investment spending and increased short-term 
earnings.145 These cuts to spending, like reductions in research and development, 
lead to short-term increases in stock valuations that eventually decrease over 
time.146  
John Coffee details how in 2017 the hedge fund Elliot Management bought 
large stakes in NRG Energy, the second largest producer of electricity in the U.S., 
 
 
140 Warren Fiske, Mark Warner says average holding time for stocks has fallen to four months, 
POLITIFACT (July 6, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2016/jul/06/mark-warner/mark-
warner-says-average-holding-time-stocks-has-f/. 
141 Leo E. Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations 
Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 
66 BUS. L. 1 (2010). One recent study found that the average share replacement rate for equity fund 
managers was 1.7 years. 2 DEGREE INVESTING INITIATIVE, THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD 11 
(2017).  
142 Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Hedge Fund Investor Activism and Takeovers, 13 (Harvard 
Bus. Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 08-004, 2007), available at: 
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdfl08-004.pdf  
143 Dallas, supra note x at 300; see also Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term 
Performance Obsession, 61 FIN. ANALYST J. 65, 69 (2005) (“The shorter the holding period, the 
more the beliefs of others rather than long-term fundamentals become central to investment 
decisions. High turnover thus sets the stage for short-term earnings-based decision making or 
momentum-motivated trading, which is not at all concerned with earnings.”). 
144 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling 
Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 449, 478 (2011). 
145 Martjin Cremers et al., Short-Term Investors, Long-Term Investments, and Firm Value: Evidence 
from Russell 2000 Index Inclusions, 66 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 4535 (2020). 
146 Id. See also Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Executive Compensation and Short-
Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 577 (2006). 
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in order to force sales of recently purchased solar and wind-based assets.147 As part 
of its push to sell-off NRG’s $4 billion renewable energy business, Elliot placed a 
former utility regulator on the board who described himself as “battling this global 
warming hoax for 6 years now.”148 NRG’s stock soared after the shake-up, and just 
months later, in early 2018, Elliott exited its position, selling 10 million shares of 
NRG, and pocketing a 130% return.149 How less energy-diversified NRG will fare 
in the coming years, only time will tell, but this story is consistent with a market 
that undervalues climate-risk resilient assets. From the perspective of the hedge 
fund, it makes sense to force a company to sell assets that the market undervalues 
in the short term. But with carbon regulation increasingly inevitable, the sale may 
end up damaging NRG’s long-term prospects. 
The lack of demand for long term risk analysis may be exacerbated by the rise 
of passive investment strategies, like indexing and exchange traded funds 
(ETFs).150 At present, around half of US stock held in investment funds are 
passively managed.151 Passive investment means that the fund commits to matching 
 
 
147 John C. Coffee Jr., The Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, 
and the Public Morality 36-37 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper 373, 36-37 (2017)), 
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2057. 
148 Ed Crooks, Activists clash over direction for NRG Energy, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017), 
ft.com/content/89417ba2-1d3e-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9. 
149 FINTEL, Elliott Management Corporation closes position in NRG / NRG Energy, Inc. (May 15, 
2018), https://fintel.io/so/us/nrg/elliott-management; Carleton English, What Activist Elliott 
Management Looks for in a Utility Stock — and How Investors Can Take Advantage, BARRON’S 
(July 3, 2020), https://www.barrons.com/articles/beaten-down-utility-stocks-could-power-up-
51593710476. 
150 This concern that the rise of indexing has drowned out the market drivers of supply and demand 
that are crucial for accurately pricing a stock has been expressed elsewhere, with varying degrees 
of hysteria. See Inigo Fraser-Jenkins et al., The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investing is 
Worse Than Marxism, SANFORD C. BERNSTEIN & CO., LLC (Aug. 23, 2016) (warning that passive 
investing eliminates the mechanism which “optimize[s] the flows of capital in the real economy”); 
Jonathan Brogaard, Matthew Ringgenberg & David Sovich, The Economic Impact of Index 
Investing, REV. OF FIN. STUD. (forthcoming July 5, 2018) (available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2663398) (concluding from an empirical study of the impact of index 
investing on commodity price signals that “[c]onsistent with a feedback channel in which market 
participants learn from prices, our results suggest that index investing in financial markets distorts 
the price signal thereby generating a negative externality that impedes firms' ability to make 
production decisions”); Eric Belasco, Michael Finke & David Nanigian, The Impact of Passive 
Investing on Corporate Valuation, 38 MANAGERIAL FIN. 1067, 1082 (2012) (concluding from 
empirical study that “the preference shift towards index fund investing is reducing the informational 
efficiency of stock prices”). 
151 John Detrixhe, Half of US stock fund assets are now invested in index funds, QUARTZ (May 20, 
2019), https://qz.com/1623418/index-funds-now-account-for-half-the-us-stock-market/. 
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and maintaining its portfolio to meet a certain stock index.152 Because index funds 
“buy and hold” sections of the market, they have little need for expensive equity 
analyst recommendations on whether to buy or sell. Indexing has grown rapidly 
over the years, with hundreds of millions of dollars exiting active funds and 
entering passive funds.153 As consumer demand for actively managed funds 
declines, so does the budget for equity research.154 The number of equity analysts 
employed by investment funds has steadily declined in recent years,155 with the 12 
largest investment banks employing 25% fewer analysts in 2019 as compared to 
2011.156 One report quoted an analyst as saying their “biggest and fastest growing 
client base is the hedge fund industry, which pushes analysts to be short-term.”157  
Index funds, unlike the buyers and sellers in an active market, are constrained 
by their investment strategy. They cannot sell out of a stock they believe is grossly 
overvalued. One index fund manager, in explaining his worry that the market 
misprices climate risk, acknowledges that his firm’s indexing strategy prevents the 
use of exit, which would otherwise drive down the price of an overinflated stock: 
“It’s of paramount importance to us that the market is able to reflect risk and 
opportunity in stock prices, particularly for our index funds, which don’t get to 
select the stocks they own.”158 But if long-term investors think climate risks are 
 
 
152 See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law, 1976 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 1 (1976). 
153 One investment research company dubbed the phenomenon “flowmageddon.” Russel Kinnel, 
It’s Flowmageddon!, MORNINGSTAR (Apr. 7, 2016), 
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/747879/its-flowmageddon. 
154 Robin Wigglesworth, Final Call for the Research Analyst?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/85ee225a-ec4e-11e6-930f-061b01e23655 (charting the decline in the 
number of total equity analysts employed, and attributing it, in part, to the competitive pressure from 
passive funds).  
155 Sarah Gordon, Sellside Research Would Be Little Missed, FIN. TIMES, (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/0609b1b4-ec51-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6 (referring to sellside 
analysts as “a dying breed.”). 
156 Robin Wigglesworth & Philip Stafford, Analyst Coverage Shrinks After Fee Shake-Up, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/a85848e0-1507-11ea-9ee4-
11f260415385; see also Justina Lee, Analyst Jobs Vanish as a Perfect Storm Crashes Into Research 
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-19/analyst-jobs-vanish-as-a-
perfect-storm-hits-wall-street-research (Dec. 19, 2019) (reporting that spending on buy side research 
has fallen 20% to 30%, and is likely to fall that much again in the near future, in part because 
“Machines are doing a lot more of the work and investors are piling into passive funds,” but also 
due to EU MiFID II regulations that requires research costs to be separated from trading fees in 
client billing, forcing banks to directly justify the cost of research). 
157 2 DEGREE INVESTING, ALL SWANS, supra, note X at 59 (quoting an anonymous “Vice President 
of ESG Research,” as reporting that “The highest volume customers of sell-side equity research are 
hedge funds. This prevents a stronger focus on long-term risks.”) 
158 F. William McNabb III & Glenn Booraem, Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report, HARV. 
L. SCH. FORUM CORP. GOV. (Sept. 18, 2017), 
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“substantially more financially material than do other investors,”159 how are they 
to convince shorter term traders to incorporate these risks into their trading 
strategy? One way might be to simply calculate and then publicly release 
information on climate risk mispricing in the hope that the market responds. One 
of the first (and still best) studies of physical risk mispricing was produced by asset 
manager BlackRock.160  
Some corporate observers caution that short-term trading based on market 
volatility, rather than fundamental financial analysis, will lead to “herding effects,” 
in which individual investors make under-informed trades based on market 
responses to limited information, such as earnings reports.161 This follow-the-leader 
game of stock valuation leads to distortions away from efficient pricing. Index 
investing, is in some sense, the ultimate herd. Recent studies provide some evidence 
that the growth of passive investing does in fact increase the potential for correlated 
market effects, but much more research on the issue is needed.162 
 
 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/18/investment-stewardship-2017-annual-report/; see also 
Examining the Macroeconomic Impacts of a Changing Climate, Prepared for the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Comm. on Fin. Services, Subcomm. on National Security, Int’l Dev. and Monetary 
Pol’y (Sept. 11, 2019) (written testimony of Alicia Seiger, Managing Director, Stanford Sustainable 
Fin. Initiative) (testifying that passive investors are exposed to systemic mispriced climate risks 
when active traders fail to trade on foreseeable climate risk information). 
159 Krueger, Sautner & Starks, supra note X. 
160 See Getting Physical, supra note X.  
161 Scott Russell, Regulation Fair Disclosure: The Death of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
and the Birth of Herd Behavior, 82 B.U. L. REV. 527, 528 (2002); Dallas, supra, note X at 315 
(“Markets also absorb less diverse information when unsophisticated investors rely on certain public 
information, such as quarterly earnings, and the sophisticated investors follow this uninformed 
herd.”) 
162 Andrew Haldane, Exec. Director, Fin. Stability, Bank of England, The Age of Asset 
Management?, Address at the London Business School (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech723.pdf; Enrica 
Bolognesi & Andrea Zuccheri, On the Efficiency of Benchmarks Composition: a Behavioural 
Perspective, Italian Association of Scholars of Economics and Management of Financial 
Institutions and Markets (ADEIMF) (2008); Doron Israeli, Charles M. C. Lee & Suhas A. Sridharan, 
Is there a dark side to exchange traded funds? An information perspective, 22 REV. ACCOUNT STUD. 
1048, 1078 (2017) (presenting empirical analyses which support the conclusion that increased ETF 
ownership leads to less analyst coverage of underlying securities and a decrease in firm-specific 
information being integrated into stock prices); see also On the ETF Divide, 34 GRANT’S INTEREST 
RATE OBSERVER (Oct. 14, 2016) (using Exxon as an example of a stock that is overvalued as a result 
of ETF pricing, and pointing out that if you had shown a rational investor Exxon’s 2016 financial 
metrics back in 2013, they would have shorted the stock and yet lost money); Michael S. Piwowar, 
SEC, Commissioner, SEC-NYU Dialogue on Exchange-Traded Products (Sept. 8, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-piwowar-2017-09-08 (former SEC Commissioner 
describing the evidence on whether passive investing leads to reduced market efficiency as 
“mixed”); cf. Lawrence Glosten, Suresh Nallareddy & Yuan Zou, ETF Activity and Informational 
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Concerns that the rapid rise of indexing will lead to inefficient markets are 
typically dismissed with the explanation that the remaining active funds will engage 
in trading that will result in the accurate pricing of equity.163 However, these active 
funds typically have a shorter holding period and investment horizon than index 
funds, and are interested in short-term, rather long-term profits.164 BlackRock 
responds to allegations that its ETFs distort efficient stock pricing by pointing out 
that there is an “extremely diverse” set of indexes: ones with “a broad market focus, 
others with a geographic focus, and still others with a sector-specific focus.”165 The 
company argues that their investor-customers make the decision as to which index 
best suits their needs. The implication is that this asset allocation decision itself 
affects price efficiency, as it reflects investor demand. A counter response to this 
defense is that price efficiency is about individual stocks, not baskets of stocks. Or, 
if we take BlackRock’s argument that index selection is just another form of active 
management—impacting price efficiency—then perhaps index providers should be 
regulated as financial advisors.166   
The increasing flow of money into ESG investment products ($20 billion in 
2019 only)167 suggests that investors are in fact waking up to climate-related risks 
and potential mispricing. But the main vehicle for ESG investing tends to be 
“passive” funds that track an ESG index whose composition has been determined 
by companies’ ESG scores. These ESG metrics and indices have come under fire 
for misleading investors as to their methodology and composition.168 Here, the 
question arises as to how much of an informed decision an investor is making when 
 
 
Efficiency of Underlying Securities 37 (Columbia Bus. School Research Paper No. 16-71, 2019) 
(finding that “ETF activity can improve short-run informational efficiency for underlying stocks”). 
163 See Myles Udland, The laziest investing argument in the world gets blown up, BUS. INSIDER 
(May 2, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/passive-investing-makes-markets-more-efficient-
2016-5 (summarizing the argument that index funds make the market more efficient by removing 
inexperienced investors from the price-determining mechanisms of supply and demand).  
164 Strine Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? supra at 1915. 
165 BLACKROCK, INDEX INVESTING SUPPORTS VIBRANT CAPITAL MARKETS, 14 (Oct. 2017). 
166 Robertson, Passive in Name Only supra note X at 848; Paul Mahoney & Adriana Robertson, 
Advisers by Another Name, UVA Law and Economics Paper Series 2021-01; see also Johannes 
Petry, Jan Fichtner & Eelke Heemskerk, Steering Capital: The Growing Private Authority of Index 
Providers in the Age of Passive Asset Management, REV. INT’L POLITICAL ECON (2019) (arguing 
that index providers “steer capital with their indices as inclusions of firms or countries to an index 
can lead to inflows of billions of US$ while exclusions can cause large quasi-automatic outflows”). 
167 CFTC REPORT, supra note X at 114, citing John Hale, Sustainable Fund Flows in 2019 Smash 
Previous Records, MORNINGSTAR (Jan 10, 2020). 
168 ESG scores from the main five ESG data providers are uncorrelated for any given company. 
Florian Berg, Julian F. Koelbel & Roberto Rigobon, Aggregate Confusion: The Divergence of ESG 
Ratings 31 (MIT Sloan School Working Paper 5822-19, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438533 (finding that “ESG rating divergence 
is not merely driven by difference in opinions, but also by disagreements about underlying data.”). 
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allocating assets to these bundles of stocks. As Adriana Robertson has argued, the 
investor is, in a way, delegating asset allocation decisions to the creator of the ESG 
index.169 This delegation may come with underexplored agency costs and third-
party mediation that obscures price efficiency. Vanguard’s ESG US Stock ETF was 
called out by the Financial Times for including companies like Kinder Morgan and 
Marathon Petroleum, despite claiming to “specifically exclude” fossil fuels.170 One 
analysis of funds offered in the UK found that more than one-third of those 
marketed as climate or low-carbon focused nevertheless contained oil and gas 
stocks.171 
5. Misinformation and Biases 
 
In order for the market to be efficient it must incorporate all publicly available 
information into share prices.172 But what if the market is broadly failing to make 
informed assessments, despite available information? Billionaire investor Jeremy 
Grantham has repeatedly argued that the market is failing to reasonably account for 
expected climate impacts:  
[T]his is the first time in history, I believe, where a significant chunk 
of the US investment community does not believe in the most 
important factor that will affect [the energy] sector – climate change. 
Why? Because we have had a 30-year, well-funded program to 
make the problem of climate change seem vague, distant, and 
problematic. . . . How many [climate] deniers does it take to distort 
the price? How can this not affect the market’s probabilities of 
carbon taxes, energy regulations, and other important factors?”173 
Over the last few decades, fossil-fuel companies, related industries, and their 
allies, have gone to great lengths to spread misinformation and doubt about the 
existence and impacts of climate change.174 The Trump administration aided in this 
disinformation campaign. Federal agency websites have been overhauled to remove 
 
 
169 Robertson, supra note X, at 848; see also Petry et al., supra note X at 20.  
170 Rennison & Nauman, supra note X. 
171 Adrienne Buller, ‘Doing Well by Doing Good’? Examining the rise of ESG Investing, COMMON-
WEALTH (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.common-wealth.co.uk/reports/doing-well-by-doing-good-
examining-the-rise-of-environmental-social-governance-esg-investing. 
172 Semi-strong form of efficiency see MOME 
173 Jeremy Grantham, The Race for Our Lives, GMO (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.gmo.com/americas/research-library/the-race-of-our-lives-revisited/. 
174 NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS 
OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING (2010). 
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the term “climate change,” deleting whole documents and webpages on the issue.175 
The head of the Environmental Protection Agency said in a 2017 CNBC interview 
that he does not believe carbon dioxide to be a “primary contributor” to global 
warming.176 
These efforts have had a well-documented influence on public opinion.177 
While an increasing percentage of the population now agrees that climate change 
is occurring—primarily because of their direct observations of extreme weather—
understanding of its causes and effects are poor. In a 2018 survey in Germany, only 
31% of respondents correctly answered “no” to the question of whether ocean 
evaporation due to higher temperatures was predicted to lead to declines in global 
sea-level. Fifty-one percent thought that the ozone hole is the main cause of the 
greenhouse effect.178 
A recent survey asked 439 institutional investors about their assessment of 
climate related risks.179 Forty percent of the respondents indicated that they 
expected more than 2C of warming by the end of the century, and just 12% 
expected an increase of more than 3C. This means 60% of institutional investors 
believe warming will stay below 2C despite the evidence that even if all countries 
were to fully meet their emissions targets and pledges under the Paris Agreement, 
warming by 2100 would likely reach 2.8C.180 Their beliefs are misaligned not only 
with scientific projections, but also with their own portfolio allocations, most of 
which hold fossil assets that, if correctly valued, are aligned with a world headed 
to at least 3C.181  
 
 
175 ENVIRONMENTAL DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, CHANGING THE DIGITAL CLIMATE: HOW 
CLIMATE CHANGE WEB CONTENT IS BEING CENSORED UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
(2018). 
176 Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruitt-global-warming.html. 
177  
178 Monika Taddicken, Anne Reif & Imke Hoppe, What do people know about climate change ― 
and how confident are they? On measurements and analyses of science related knowledge, 17 J. OF 
SCIENCE AND COMM. 1, 11-12 (2018). 
179 Philipp Krueger, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, The Importance of Climate Risks for 
Institutional Investors 27-28 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 18-58, 2019) 
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3235190). 
180 CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, Temperatures: Addressing global warming, 
https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/, (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
181 Alastair Marsh, ‘Portfolio Warming’ Is the New Climate Anxiety for Fund Managers 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2021). 
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CEOs of American companies are disproportionately old, white, male, and 
conservative, as compared to the general population.182 So are their boards.183 
Numerous studies have shown that this demographic is especially likely to deny the 
existence of climate change, or to downplay its effects.184 In a 2018 poll, only 18% 
of Republicans in the baby boomer generation and older believed that the earth was 
warming due to human activity.185 Sitting board members and executives of major 
financial institutions have come under fire for their record as climate deniers.186 
Even when market actors have access to valid information concerning climate 
risks, their risk-assessment judgment is still tempered by persistent cognitive 
biases. Climate change, a long-term process not easily discernable in our daily lives, 
poses a challenge to accurate human threat assessment for a number of reasons. 
Psychological research has demonstrated that humans suffer from a status quo bias, 
whereby we not only prefer current conditions but also irrationally assume they will 
 
 
182 Jeff Green, Jordyn Holman & Janet Paskin, America’s C-Suites Keep Getting Whiter (and More 
Male, Too), BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-
21/america-s-c-suites-keep-getting-whiter-and-more-male-too; Claire Zillman, The Fortune 500 
Has More Female CEOs Than Ever Before, FORTUNE (May 16, 2019), 
https://fortune.com/2019/05/16/fortune-500-female-
ceos/#:~:text=In%20the%20latest%20Fortune%20500,a%20whole%3B%20just%206.6%25.  (As 
of June 2019, just 33 of the Fortune 500 CEOs were women, and women comprised only 25% of 
Fortune 500 boards.). 
183 Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, Roberto Tallarita & David Weiss, The Politics of CEOs, 11 J. OF 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 450, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3355690 (“We find that 58% of CEOs are 
Republicans (so defined), while only 18% are Democrat (and the remaining 24% Neutral). 
Furthermore, Republican CEOs lead companies with more than twice the asset value of companies 
led by Democratic CEOs.”) 
184 Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Cool Dudes: The Denial of Climate Shange Among 
Conservative White Males in the United States, 21 GLOBAL ENVT’L CHANGE 1-2 (2011) 
(summarizing literature “finding that self-identified liberals, non-whites, and females are more 
likely to express concern about global warming than are their conservative, white, and male 
counterparts, respectively”); see also PWC, THE COLLEGIALITY CONUNDRUM: FINDING BALANCE IN 
THE BOARDROOM 19, 32 (2019) (Finding that “64% of female directors think investors are giving 
environmental/ sustainability issues the right amount of attention, compared to just 33% of male 
directors,” and that 49% of all directors indicated that environmental expertise was either “not very 
important” or “not at all important” to include in a board’s competencies (it was ranked the least 
important out of 13 categories of expertise.)). 
185 Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans see climate change and the environment in 7 
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continue.187 This bias may influence shareholders to undervalue the significance of 
climate risk.188  
The rational assessment of climate risk is further muddled by the very nature 
of information about climate change. Behavioral psychology tells us that 
information is complicated and “difficult to decipher” is more likely to be discarded 
as untrue.189 Market actors suffer from a number of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, 
which can derail the rational processing of complicated information. First, the 
availability heuristic may cause people to excessively discount the possibility of 
“black swan” climate events unless they’ve recently encountered salient examples 
of such events.190 But, by definition, these high-impact low-probability events are 
unlikely to occur frequently. Investors and managers, failing to find examples of 
these events in their everyday lives, may proceed with this diminished cognitive 
salience to downplay serious climate risks to their companies and portfolios.191 
Because the availability heuristic prioritizes risks which are both vivid and salient, 
long-term, high-impact, yet low probability climate risk events may be irrationally 
devalued.192 
Rational decision making is also stymied by a myopic focus on immediate 
rewards irrespective of the long-term consequences of those rewards.193 Market 
actors are predisposed to prefer short term goal gratification regardless of its long 
term consequences.194 This “present-bias” also inhibits people from accurately 
 
 
187 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, J. OF RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
188 Katie Critchlow, Irrational Apathy: Investigating behavioural economic explanations for the 
Carbon Bubble (2016) (dissertation London School of Economics Dissertation) (available at 
https://www.academia.edu/16319184/Investigating_behavioural_biases_and_the_carbon_bubble); 
see generally Elke U. Weber, What shapes perceptions of climate change?, 1 WILEY INTERDISC. 
REVS.: CLIMATE CHANGE 332 (2010). 
189 ADAM SZYSZKA, BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS: HOW PSYCHOLOGY 
INFLUENCES INVESTORS AND CORPORATIONS (2013) (citing Rolf Reber & Norbert Schwarz, Effects 
of Perceptual Fluency on Judgments of Truth, 8 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 338 (1999). 
190 Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, supra note X (citing Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127-28 
(1974)). 
191 Id. at 12.  
192 Cass Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-benefit Analysis, and Climate 
Change, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 195, 195-196 (2006). 
193  Lisa Zaval & James F. M. Cornwell, Cognitive Biases, Non-Rational Judgments, and Public 
Perceptions of Climate Change, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 10 
(2016) (citing George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence 
and an Interpretation, 107 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 573 (1992)). 
194 Walter Mischel & Ebbe Ebbesen, Attention in Delay of Gratification, 16 J. OF PERSONALITY AND 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 329-337 (1970). 
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considering future benefits with upfront costs.195 This bias may be particularly 
disastrous in the context of climate change, where adaption may require significant 
capital expenditures in the near-term in exchange for mitigated losses (or gains 
relative to competitors) farther in the future. 
Individuals are influenced by the availability heuristic – the tendency to give 
greater importance to events that happened recently, or that are easier to recall.196 
For this reason, market actors are most likely to imagine a future that looks similar 
to the recent past, even if it means ignoring broader scientific understanding.197 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s Prospect Theory suggests that company 
executives may be reluctant to spend upfront capital on climate adaptation 
measures, even if those measures save the company money in the long run. Under 
Prospect Theory’s certainty effect, individuals put more weight on outcomes that 
are certain, and less weight on outcomes that are uncertain, discounting them by 
more than the rational weighting of their probability of occurrence.198 Thus, 
managers may overweight the costs of adaptation measures in the present, which 
have a certain, known, price tag, and underweight expected future climate damages 
whose magnitude and timing is more uncertain.  
Managers may be subject to cognitive biases that encourage them to 
withhold share value-decreasing information.  Donald Langevoort argues that, even 
in the absence of intentional misrepresentation, managers “may subconsciously 
perceive information in a way, if at all possible, that permits them to maintain 
consistency with their self-image of efficacy and control, thereby justifying (to 
themselves and others) preservation of their positions and status.”199  In the face of 
great uncertainty around the future of carbon regulation, managers may disregard 
future scenarios for decreased oil demand that are well within the realm of 
possibility, and focus instead on more favorable predicted pathways.200 The Wall 
 
 
195 Zaval & Cornwell, supra note X, at X. 
196 Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty supra note X at 1127-28. 
197 Choi & Pritchard, supra note X at 12 (“The availability heuristic may lead people to discount 
excessively the possibility of losses from high magnitude but low probability risks if such a loss has 
not occurred recently.”) citing Tversky & Kahneman, supra note X at 1127-28. 
198 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice 211 (4481) SCIENCE 453-458 (1981) (arguing that the certainty effect is shown when people 
prefer certain outcomes and underweight outcomes that are only probable); Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 
(1979). The certainty effect can contribute to market actors seeking risk when one of their options 
is a sure loss (e.g., an upfront capital expenditure or the abandonment of a project). 
199 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why  Corporations Mislead 
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.  L. REV. 101 (1997). 
200 In 2016, a small group of Exxon shareholders expressed concern that the company was “eroding 
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Street Journal reports that an Exxon geoscientist lost his job after he challenged 
senior executives: “We acknowledge the need to reduce our emissions, yet they are 
set to increase by at least 20% over the next five years,” he asked at a town hall 
meeting. “In the end, wouldn’t you agree that this is a problem of behaviors and 
leadership?”201  
While the ECMH accepts that human traders have irrational biases, these 
biases are characterized as random and therefore cancel one another out, “leaving 
price to reflect a single, best-informed aggregate forecast.”202 Of course, in the 
situation where investor biases are not in fact random, but aligned, they will not 
cancel-out; they will aggregate, and influence the market price.203 
6. Corporate Opposition / Regulatory Capture 
 
Shareholders concerned about climate risk have begun to press for disclosure 
directly from companies themselves. Their efforts, however, face opposition from 
corporate management, not only directly, but also through industry influence on 
government regulators.204  
 
 
from 2005 to 2014, coinciding with a 1 percent net income decline” and that Exxon had cut capital 
distributions to shareholders (through both dividends and buybacks) by 25 percent in the preceding 
year. Similarly concerned shareholders of Chevron pointed to a Chatham House report that 
concluded “the only realistic option” for oil majors is to provide cash to shareholders and “shrink 
into the remaining areas of operation…where they can earn an acceptable return.”  The report noted 
that this action “would require a major change in [firms’] corporate culture.” 
201 Christopher M. Matthews, Exxon Used to be America’s Most Valuable Company. What 
Happened?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2020). 
202 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VIRGINIA 
L. REV 549, 581 (1984) (“Although each trader's own forecasts are skewed by the unique constraints 
on his or her judgment, other traders will have offsetting constraints. The random biases of 
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aggregate forecast.”) 
203 ANDREI SCHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 12 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (“Recall that the second line of defense of the efficiency markets theory 
is that the irrational investors, while they may exist, trade randomly, and hence cancel each other 
out…. The psychological evidence shows precisely that people do not deviate from rationality 
randomly, but rather most deviate in the same way.”); see also Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency supra note X at X (explaining that unsystematic bias "washes out" over trading). 
204 In 2016 the SEC sought guidance on the need for updated rules on environmental risk disclosure. 
In the thousands of comments the agency received, investors were generally in favor of “more 
extensive and rule-like disclosure” while corporations were opposed. Business and Financial 
Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K: Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg 23916 (Apr. 22, 2016)); 
Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG  Reporting  Reform  
from  the  Regulation  S-K  Concept  Release, 65 VILL.L. REV. 67 (2020). A 2019 report by PwC 
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survey responses, 56% of directors indicated they thought institutional investors were devoting too 
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In response to growing shareholder support for climate disclosure resolutions, 
the National Association for Manufacturers (NAM) funded the formation of the 
Main Street Investors Coalition, a group that advocates against the influence of 
institutional shareholders and their focus on ESG issues. Many fossil fuel 
executives, including those of Exxon and Shell, sit on NAM’s board of directors.205 
The Coalition’s executive director has argued that shareholder climate risk 
disclosure resolutions are motivated by asset managers’ personal “political 
objectives” rather than genuine concern for assessing investment risk.206 The 
Coalition claims that asset managers are “hiding their end goal from the retail 
investors they claim to protect” because “[i]f successful, these efforts will 
ultimately channel investment away from companies, in the process harming the 
value of the stock and with it the value of investors’ holdings.”207 Of course, if 
accurate disclosure reveals that equities are overvalued due to unaccounted-for 
risks, long-term investors should want them to go down. Better to lose some value 
now, than more later in a bubble burst. 
The Main Street Investor Coalition was a vocal supporter of several Trump-era 
regulations that have the net effect of making it harder for investors to reflect 
climate risk in their asset allocation decisions. Under Trump, the SEC finalized two 
rules that limit investor power to press for climate risk disclosure from companies: 
one that limits the ability of investors to propose and re-propose shareholder 
resolutions;208 and another that increases issuer power relative to proxy advisory 
firms that counsel institutional investors on shareholder votes.209 In addition, the 
Department of Labor amended regulations under the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act to require that retirement plan fiduciaries exclusively consider 
 
 
much attention to environmental issues. This was true even though only 50% of directors agreed 
that their board “has a strong understanding of the ESG issues impacting their company” and only 
34% said that “ESG is regularly part of the board’s agenda.” PWC’S 2019 ANNUAL CORPORATE 
DIRECTORS SURVEY at 4, 20. 
205 Susan Moran, Most Oil Giants Still Fighting Shareholder Pressure to Address Climate, THE 
CLIMATE DOCKET (Apr. 11, 2019). 
206 George David Banks, Environmental Shareholder Resolutions Will Never Deliver the Climate 
Consensus that America Needs, WASH. EXAMINER (June 13, 2018). 
207 Id. 
208 Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule (Sept. 
23, 2020). 
209 See Press Release, Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, SEC, Paying More For Less: Higher Costs for 
Shareholders, Less Accountability for Management (July 22, 2020) (dissent arguing that the rule 
will lead to “less accountability on climate risk”). SEC Commissioner Robert Jackson, who voted 
against the proposals, warned that this limiting of shareholder influence “makes it easier for insiders 
to run public companies in a way that favors their own private interests over those of ordinary 
investors.” Press Release, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, SEC, Statement on Proposals to Restrict 
Shareholder Voting (Nov. 5, 2019). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782675
Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble 
 
    39 
“financial factors” relevant to the economic value of an investment.210 And the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency finalized a rule prohibiting large banks 
from excluding categories of industries, like fossil fuels, from their loan business.211 
SEC Commissioner Hester Pierce has spoken out against shareholder advocacy 
for heightened environmental disclosures, arguing they are motivated by “public 
shaming” rather than interest in informed investing.212 In 2019, the SEC granted 
45% of company requests to exclude shareholder proposals related to climate 
change from the proxy process, meaning they never went to a vote.213  
 
C. MARKET FAILURE 
 
While a growing number of investors argue that climate risks remain mispriced, 
they cannot correct the mispricing on their own. Informed investors are limited in 
their ability to arbitrage away mispricings, particularly those that are widespread, 
and for which the timing of market correction is difficult to predict.214 And while 
investors have made some progress in getting corporations to disclose climate-
related risks under voluntary frameworks, these frameworks are insufficient as they 
provide broad discretion to issuers and little assurance as to accuracy of the 
information provided. 
 
1. Inability of Market to Self-Correct 
 
If there is in fact systemic and irrational investor bias, ECMH posits that 
rationally informed arbitrageurs will exploit the mispricing, reaping a profit while 
bringing the prices back to their fundamental values.215 However, practical limits 
to arbitrage in the real world means that the knowledge that assets valuations ignore 
 
 
210 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550 (2020); Press Release, Ceres, Ignoring overwhelming opposition, 
Labor Department adopts new rule that will impair ESG investing (Oct. 30, 2020). An earlier version 
of the rule proposed directly prohibiting the consideration of ESG factors. 
211 Fair Access to Financial Services, 85 Fed. Reg. 75,261 (Nov. 25, 2020) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 55); Eric Rosenbaum, Trump bank regulator’s new rule incurs Wall Street and climate 
investor ire on his way out the door, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2021). 
212 Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, SEC, Scarlet Letters: Remarks before the American Enterprise 
Institute (June 18, 2019). 
213 Brett McDonnell, Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel, & Anita Foerster, Green Boardrooms? 
CONN. L. REV., forthcoming at 47 (2021), citing Majority Action, Climate Change in the 
Boardroom: How Asset Manager Voting Shaped Corporate Climate Action in 2019 at 8; Steven 
Mufson, Exxon Shareholders Want Action on Climate change. The SEC Calls It Micromanagement., 
WASH. POST (May 8, 2019).  
214 See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis, supra note X at 333. 
215 See SHLEIFER, supra note X, at 4; Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency. 
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are climate risks does not necessarily enable an investor to make a profitable trade 
on that information, without knowledge of when these risks will be exposed and 
repriced.  
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is the most widely used model for 
calculating the equilibrium price of stocks. It assumes that all investors have access 
to the same publicly available information and that all investors have homogeneous 
expectations about future valuations. In the real market, however, investors may 
have access to different amounts of information and may form different forecasts 
about the future.216 When shareholders hold increasingly heterogenous 
expectations about the future, “one would expect increasingly inefficient prices, at 
least as judged by the yardstick of the CAPM.”217 
Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter have explained that heterogeneity in 
shareholder expectations is more likely to occur in situations when shareholders 
face uncertainty in predicting the future, such as “when there is a change in 
technology, when glamour companies emerge, or when companies running newer 
businesses with less established track records become an important part of the 
market.”218 Climate change presents a similar shift in the status quo that impedes 
reliable forecasting.  
Even if some group of shareholders are informed, the speculative aspect of 
stock prices might lead them to hold on to their stock rather than sell it knowing 
that climate skeptics and backward-facing algorithms are going to maintain demand 
in the immediate future. A well-informed investor may suspect, or even know, that 
a stock is overvalued and deviating from fundamental value diminished by climate 
risk, but she may nevertheless be powerless to influence the trends of the market.219 
Why aren’t savvy investors shorting stocks misvalued due to climate risk? And 
shouldn’t this shorting mechanism itself move prices closer to fundamental value? 
Some investors are in fact banking on the mispricing. David Burt, profiled in 
Michael Lewis’s book The Big Short, is known for having predicted the 2008 
subprime crisis and helping Cornwall Capital make millions of dollars through 
 
 
216 Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency supra note X at 577. 
217 Id. at 561-62 n. 41, (citing Stephen Figlewski, Information Diversity and Market Behavior, 37 J. 
FIN. 87, 101 (1982) (“heterogeneous expectations as obstacles to short and long run equilibrium 
prices”)); see also Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 
1153-54 (1977) (“badly informed investors tend to overprice risky assets”). 
218 Bratton & Watcher, supra note X at 707. 
219 ROBERT J. SCHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 197 (Princeton Univ. Press; 3rd ed. 2015) (“If 
indeed one knew today that the market would do poorly over the next ten or twenty years, but did 
not know exactly when it would begin to do poorly and could not prove one’s knowledge to a broad 
audience, then there would be no way to profit significantly from this knowledge.”). 
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shorting the market.220 He has recently appeared in headlines again, this time for 
heading an investment firm whose strategy is betting against residential mortgage-
backed securities with exposure to coastal regions at risk from extreme weather 
events.221 
But beyond these asset-specific shorting strategies, the large literature on the 
“limits to arbitrage” details why informed arbitrageurs are very limited in their 
ability to correct broad market mispricings.222 Arbitrageurs can’t short the whole 
market, and they lack the resources to correct market-, or even industry-wide 
bubbles.223 Mere knowledge that the market is out of step with reality, and behaving 
like a bubble is not enough – a trader must also have some ability to predict just 
when the market will come to its senses and the bubble will burst.224 Without this, 
they will be left holding a short position that requires substantial funds to hold, 
funds that their clients are uncomfortable, or incapable of, holding over long 
periods of time.225  
2. Failures of Voluntary Disclosure Standards 
 
Shareholders, especially institutional investors, have woken up to the likely 
mispricing of climate risk in recent years.226 And they have begun to demand the 
 
 
220 Geoff Dembicki, A ‘Big Short’ Investor’s New Bet: Climate Change Will Bust the Housing 
Market, VICE (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en/article/wjwyy9/a-big-short-investors-new-
bet-climate-change-will-bust-the-housing-market. 
221 Kate Duguid, Citing Climate Risk, Investors Bet Against Mortgage Market, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 
2019) (He tells prospective clients “The market’s failure to integrate climate science with investment 
analysis has created a mispricing phenomenon that is possibly larger than the mortgage credit bubble 
of the mid-2000s.”); Diana Quick, Former Subprime Player Claims He Can Now Short the 
Mortgage Market for Climate and Covid Risks, CNBC (Nov. 23, 2020). 
222 See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 208-213 (2010) 
(summarizing literature). 
223 See SHLEIFER, supra note X, at 13-14 (“An arbitrageur who thinks that stocks as a whole are 
overpriced cannot sell short stocks and buy a substitute portfolio, since such a portfolio does not 
exist. The arbitrageur can instead simply sell or reduce exposure to stocks in the hope of an above-
market return, but this arbitrage is no longer even approximately riskless, especially since the 
average expected return on stocks is high and positive. If the arbitrageur is risk averse, his interest 
in such arbitrage will be limited. With a finite risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs as a group, their 
aggregate ability to bring prices of broad groups of securities into line is limited as well.”); id. at 51 
(“Of course, when we get into the realm of quasi-arbitrage, where the relative prices of broad groups 
of securities seem to be out of whack, the risks become even more substantial… As long as 
arbitrageurs have short horizons and so must worry about liquidating their investment in a mispriced 
asset, their aggressiveness will be limited even in the absence of a fundamental risk.”) 
224 Schwartz, supra note X at 213; Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral 
Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 96-97 (2003); SHLIEFER, supra note X at 156-74. 
225 SHLIEFER, supra note X at 182 
226 BLACKROCK, GETTING PHYSICAL, supra note X.  
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information they need for risk assessment via voluntary disclosures, through open 
letters to CEOs and votes in favor of disclosure proxy proposals over the opposition 
of management.227 The private sector has come to something of a consensus around 
the default standard for a voluntary disclosure regime: the Task Force on Climate-
Related Disclosure (TCFD) produced a reporting framework in 2017 that is meant 
to be “widely adoptable” and “applicable to organizations across all sectors and 
jurisdictions.”228 The framework recommends eleven categories of disclosure, 
organized under four core elements covering governance, strategy, risk 
management, and metrics and targets.229 Some investors and experts have pushed 
for companies to report against industry-specific standards in addition to their 
TCFD disclosures.230  
Voluntary reporting frameworks, however, are an imperfect solution to the 
problem of inadequate climate risk disclosures. Without enforcement and 
standardization, companies can pick and choose which reporting frameworks, or 
even categories of risk, within those frameworks, they disclose. This is particularly 
evident in the voluntary disclosure of fossil fuel companies to CDP, who report 
“more opportunities than risks from climate change.”231 As of 2018, the average 
voluntarily complying company provided less than 4 of the 11 disclosure metrics 
recommended under the TCFD.232 Firms have been particularly slow to employ 
scenario analysis and discuss climate-related operational risk, just 9% discussed the 
 
 
227 See, e.g., David Vetter, Wielding $9 Trillion, Investors Warn Firms From BP To BMW To Get 
Real On Climate Change, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrvetter/2020/11/16/wielding-9-trillion-investors-warn-firms-
from-bp-to-bmw-to-get-real-on-climate-change/?sh=1e931ee37ea0; Jackie Cook & Tom 
Lauricella, How Big Fund Families Voted on Climate Change: 2020 Edition, MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 
28, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1002749/how-big-fund-families-voted-on-
climate-change-2020-edition (showing average shareholder support for climate-risk disclosure 
requests climbed to an all-time high in 2020); THE VANGUARD GROUP, INC., CLIMATE RISK 
GOVERNANCE: WHAT VANGUARD EXPECTS OF COMPANIES AND THEIR BOARDS (2020). 
228 TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES iii (2017). The TCFD’s 2020 Status 
Report found that 1,340 corporations globally have expressed support for its recommendations, 
including 219 U.S. companies. Financial institutions managing $150 trillion have stated support for 
the TCFD, including X sovereign wealth funds and the world’s largest asset managers. See TASK 
FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, 2020 STATUS REPORT 68 (2020). 
229 Id. at 10. 
230 SASB 
231 CDP, MAJOR RISK OR ROSY OPPORTUNITY 7 (2019). 
232 TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, 2019 STATUS REPORT 7 (2019) (“only 
around 25% of companies disclosed information aligned with more than five out of the 11 
recommend disclosures and only 4% of companies disclosed information aligned with at least 10 of 
the recommended disclosures.”).  
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resilience of their business models to climate change.233 And disclosures are far 
more likely to dwell on transition risks than discuss physical risks.234 These 
voluntary disclosures remain nonstandardized, and are difficult for stakeholders to 
analyze and compare across companies.235 A large number of companies simply do 
not report climate risks through voluntary frameworks or otherwise. One third of 
S&P 500 companies do not disclose their own (Scope 1) emissions, a relatively 
uncomplicated metric.236   
Further, voluntary climate reporting is subject to a lower level of scrutiny 
than mandatory financial disclosure, which may impact the quality of the 
information provided. Among the S&P 500 companies, most sustainability and 
environmental disclosures lack external assurance and the vast majority of external 
assurance is done on only a fraction of the information provided.237 As a result of 
the lack of third-party audits, investors are hesitant to rely on current climate 
disclosure packaged in “sustainability” reports. Under a mandatory framework 
required by the SEC, this reporting would be reviewed by SEC staff for 
compliance.238 
 
III. SOCIETAL HARM OF CLIMATE RISK UNDERASSESSMENT 
 
Two types of harms are generated by the under-assessment of climate risk: (1) 
systemic risk to the financial system; and (2) the negative effects of climate change 
itself, as the mispricing of climate risk in the present leads to an inefficient 
allocation of investment capital. If investors fail to demand risk assessment from 
companies, managers may be left unpunished by the market when they build homes 
and hotels in hurricane prone regions too close to the shore, or build bridges to 
withstand a “100-year-flood” based on a grossly unrepresentative historical record. 
This misinvestment imposes costs not just on the company and the investor but on 
the communities harmed by collapsing bridges and hotel evacuees.  
 
 
233 Id. Scenario analysis and its utility is discussed in detail, infra, at X. 
234 Parker Bolstad et al., supra note X at 3. 
235  
236 How Much can Financiers Do About Climate Change?, THE ECONOMIST (June 20, 2020), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/06/20/how-much-can-financiers-do-about-climate-
change. 
237 Jon Lukomnik, State of Integrated and Sustainability Reporting 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/03/state-of-integrated-and-
sustainability-reporting-2018/ (reporting that only 36% of sustainability report include external 
assurance and about 90% of that assurance pertains to only some data). 
238  
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A. CLIMATE DAMAGE 
 
If the stock market fails to respond to poor managerial decisions like building 
in flood plains or mis-forecasting supply chain disruptions, capital will be allocated 
inefficiently.239 This is harmful not just to investors, but to everyone who relies on 
the goods and services these companies provide as well as those harmed by the 
externalities they generate. Disclosure of risk enhances “efficiency by improving 
corporate decisions relating to which proposed new investment projects in the 
economy are selected for implementation and how already existing projects are 
operated.”240 The majority of new public company investment comes from 
internally generated capital rather than funds raised from investors through 
financial instruments.241 Shareholders monitor the allocation of this capital through 
corporate governance mechanisms—oversight of managers and directors—rather 
than project-specific evaluation, and many of these mechanisms rely on share price 
as a proxy of success. As argued by Kevin Haeberle, inaccurate stock prices thwart 
shareholders from monitoring management and the use of corporate funds, and 
reduce “the efficiency with which society allocates its scarce capital.”242 
For example, oil and gas companies are currently allocating large up-front 
capital to the exploration and development of extractive projects that many argue 
are not net present value justified given projections of future demand in a carbon 
regulated world.243 Were carbon risks to be accurately priced, it is likely that many 
of these projects would not be greenlit. One recent report calculates that between 
40% and 50% of ExxonMobil’s upstream capital expenditure through 2025 will be 
spent on developing fossil resources that will be unsellable in a world that 
effectively implements regulation to limit warming to 2C.244 Nevertheless, once 
these projects have been brought online, the expense of development will be a sunk 
 
 
239 Zohar Goshen  &  Gideon Parchomovsky, The  Essential  Role  of Securities Regulation, 55 
DUKE L. J. 711, 720 (2006) (“Accurate pricing is essential for achieving efficient allocation of 
resources in the economy.”); cf. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic 
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICHIGAN L. REV. 613, 642-44 
(1988) (arguing that “efficient stock markets may be neither necessary nor sufficient for the proper 
allocation of capital among corporations” partly because most capital is raised outside of the equity 
markets). 
240 Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 253 (2009). 
241 See Kevin S. Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 138 (2015). 
242 Id. 
243 Martin & Kemper, supra note x. 
244 CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, 2 DEGREES OF SEPARATION: TRANSITION RISK FOR OIL AND GAS 
IN A LOW CARBON WORLD 24 (2017) (predicting that Exxon is the most exposed of the world's oil 
and gas firms to wasted capital expenditure if the atmospheric CO2 concentration is kept below 450 
ppm). 
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cost. Oil and gas companies may decide to continue to process and sell fossil fuels 
at slightly above cost in order to recoup some, but not all, of the money spent, rather 
than abandoning the project entirely. For this reason, the mispricing of carbon risk 
in the present inefficiently subsidizes the future production of fossil fuels.245   
Similarly, managers unpunished by the market have little incentive to invest in 
adaptation measures, and may neglect to spend money on elevating their factory, 
or investing in alternative energy sources, or reseaerching heat resistant crops.246 
Poor capital-allocation decisions made today will have long-lasting effects, 
particularly for projects involving infrastructure construction or purchases of 
equipment with long lifetimes and infrequent turnovers.247 
B. SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
One harm that stems from the failure to assess climate risk is the systemic nature 
of the risk itself.248 The primary way that academics and regulators have discussed 
the systemic nature of climate risk is through its possibility to cause a contagion of 
 
 
245 See Andrea Liesen, Climate Change and Financial Market Efficiency, 54 BUS. & SOCIETY 511, 
531 (2015) (explaining, “In the state of inefficiency evidenced in this research, the stock market 
does not correctly incorporate the climate-change-induced systematic risk of European companies 
when allocating ownership of capital stock. As the (incorrect) valuation of financial assets strongly 
affects the investments in assets in the real economy…capital is allocated inefficiently.”); Robert 
Barro, The Stock Market and Investment, 3 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 115, 130 (1990) (finding that changes 
in stock market prices “have a great deal of explanatory power for the growth rate investment.”); 
see also Kahan, Securities Laws, supra note X, at 1039-41 (explaining that misvalued stock prices 
can lead to the use of an inaccurate discount rate in assessing potential investment projects “which, 
in turn, lead to inefficient capital budgeting decisions”). 
246 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 672 (2006) (describing “the connection between overvalued stock and 
value-destroying decisionmaking”); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note X at X (“Contrariwise, 
if the market expects a company to invest in a line of business that the market believes will be highly 
profitable in the future, the managers will feel pressured to make the market-favored investment 
even if they understand that it is suboptimal based on their superior, contrarian information.”) 
247 JAMES WILLIAMS ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS NETWORK, POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 54 (2015). 
248 See KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMATIC RISK 24 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2006) (explaining that excessive risk taking on the part of networked individual financial 
actors can result in societal harms such as bank runs and currency collapse and that these “excessive 
costs of risk” are “shifted onto society at large as a negative externality.”); MICHIEL BIJLSMA ET AL., 
CPB DOCUMENT NO. 210, SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS, 
24-27 (2010) (describing how the interrconnectedness of the financial sector means that an under-
pricing of risk can lead to a systemic risk for the whole sector and constitutes an externality); see 
also Dallas, supra note X at 267 (linking the financial crisis to short-termism of financial 
institutions). 
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financial failures. If certain industry stocks are indeed overvalued due to the 
financial sector’s failure to account for climate risk, the market may gradually 
adjust the mispricing in a slow price decline as it incorporates new information. Or, 
the market may correct suddenly, resulting in chain-reaction effects throughout the 
financial world. The more asset prices diverge from fundamentals, the higher the 
likelihood of a large and sudden realignment, a.k.a., a bubble burst.249 A recently 
published “climate stress test of the financial system” calculated that 6 percent of 
the average investment fund’s equity holdings are in the fossil fuel industry, while 
an additional 36 percent are in “climate-policy relevant” sectors, which include 
utilities, mining, housing, and transport.250 If each of these industries has failed to 
assess and disclose their exposure to climate risk, this amounts to a great deal of 
unaccounted risk that accumulates at the portfolio-level.251  
Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England has referenced the need to 
avoid “a climate Minsky moment,” cautioning that “sharp changes in valuations” 
of energy company stock due to unanticipated market and regulatory changes can 
have domino-effects throughout the financial sector.252 Several heads of other 
central banks agree with him that a “sudden collapse of asset prices” is possible.253 
Sarah Breeden, the head of International Banks Supervisor at the Bank of England, 
has said that climate transition risk alone could constitute up to a $20 trillion loss 
 
 
249 See Dallas, supra note X at 315; Raghuram Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World 
Riskier? 1, 21-23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11728, 2005),  
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w11728/w11728.pdf. 
250 Stefano Battison et al., A Climate Stress-test of the Financial System, 7 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 283, 283-84 (2017). 
251 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (explaining that systemic risk 
can derive from aggregate risk taking on the part of many individuals because “like a tragedy of the 
commons, no individual market participant has sufficient incentive, absent regulation, to limit its 
risk taking in order to reduce the systemic danger to other participants and third parties”). 
252 Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Eng., Chair of the Fin. Stability Bd., Arthur Burns 
Memorial Lecture in Berlin: Resolving the Climate Paradox (Sept. 22, 2016); HYMAN P. MINSKY, 
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2008). 
253 Mark Carney et al., The Financial Sector Must Be at the Heart of Tackling Climate Change, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/17/the-
financial-sector-must-be-at-the-heart-of-tackling-climate-change; see also GLENN D. RUDEBUSCH, 
FED. RES, BANK OF S.F. ECONOMIC LETTER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE FED. RESERVE (2019) 
(“climate-based risk could threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole.”); MARGHERITA 
GIUZIO ET AL., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, CLIMATE CHANGE AND FINANCIAL STABILITY (2019). 
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to the financial system.254 Particular attention has been paid to the risks of a bubble 
in the coastal housing market, and relatedly, the municipal bond market.255 
There have been attempts at predicting how the financial sector will react to 
climate-induced economic losses.256 One recent paper models how climate change 
induced reduction in labor productivity and capital stock could impact the stability 
of the global banking system.257 In the model, climate impacts increase the 
frequency of firm bankruptcies and unpaid loans, requiring banks to be bailed out 
by governments, even as overall macroeconomic growth slows due to warming.258 
Under such a scenario, this banking instability can lead to financial crises 
amounting to 30% of GDP.259  
This systemic risk literature, however, is limited by its focus on the financial 
sector and contagion. Climate change poses a risk to factors of production, and to 
growth itself (labor, for example, becomes less productive in hotter temperatures). 
It therefore constitutes a macroeconomic risk that may or may not be labeled 
“systemic,” depending on whether that term can be applied to the real economy. 
Further, contagion can exist in the real economy—think of the supply chain effects 
of a major port being wiped out (or even the 1970s oil crisis).260 Climate risks 
therefore certainly constitute a systematic risk (as in broadly affecting the economy 
 
 
254 Sarah Breeden, Exec. Dir., Int’l. Banks Supervision at the Bank of Eng., Address at the Official 
Monetary & Financial Institutions Forum in London (Apr. 15, 2019). 
255 See, e.g., Eben Harrell, Are We On the Verge of Another Financial Crisis?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 
18, 2020) (“Tax-advantaged fixed-income instruments, such as municipal bonds, are a big part of many 
people’s retirement portfolios (and many insurance companies’ reserves).” 
256 See, e.g., European Systemic Risk Board, supra, note X at 13 (modelling asset revaluation in 
response to  global 2°C climate policy and finding that “major stock market indexes might fall by 
15-20 percent”). see also UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE INST. OF SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP, 
UNHEDGEABLE RISK: STRESS TESTING SENTIMENT IN A CHANGING CLIMATE (2015). 
257 Francesco Lamperti, Valentina Bosetti, Andrea Roventini & Massimo Tavoni, The Public Costs 
of Climate-Induced Financial Instability 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 829 (2019); see also Louison 
Cahen-Fourot et al., Capital Stranding Cascades: The Impact of Decarbonisation on Productive 
Asset Utilization (Ecol. Econ, Papers 18, WU Vienna University of Econ. & Bus. 2019) (modeling 
possible cascades of stranded assets that travel through multiple industries and impacting the 
financial sector). 
258 Id. at 829-830. 
259 Id. at 831. Cf. Christina Skinner, Central Banks and Climate Change 21-30 (Nov. 24, 2020) 
(unpublished) (on file at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3703142&download=yes) (arguing that banks 
do not hold sufficient amounts of carbon intensive credit assets for physical or transition risks to 
threaten their solvency in times of stress) 
260 Thanks to Onur Özgöde for discussion on this point. See also Onur Özgöde, The Emergence of 
Systemic Risk: The Federal Reserve, Bailouts, and the Monetary Government at the Limits, SOCIO-
ECON. REV. (2021) (providing historical overview of the development of the concept of “systemic 
risk”).  
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A wide range of proposals have begun to appear for encouraging market actors 
to include climate in their assessment of financial risks, including integrating 
climate risks into prudential regulation and stability monitoring,262 amending 
fiduciary duties of CEOs and asset managers,263 and integrating climate risks into 
central bank asset purchases.264 The CFTC’s 2020 report on Managing Climate 
Risk in the U.S. Financial System alone lists 53 distinct recommendations for 
regulators to take; A comprehensive discussion of recommendations is therefore 
beyond the scope of this Article.265 One particular intervention, a mandatory 
climate risk disclosure regime, has been increasingly demanded by regulators, non-
profits, and investors alike.266 And signs from the Biden Administration suggest 
that there is support for new SEC regulation mandating disclosure of climate 
risks.267 As such, the following section briefly explores how a disclosure regime 
 
 
261 See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH L. REV. 1, 17 (2020); 
RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 168–70 (10th Ed. 2011) (describing difference between firm-specific idiosyncratic risk, 
and portfolio-wide systematic risk). 
262 Graham Steele, Confronting the ‘Climate Lehman Moment’: The Case for Macroprudential 
Climate Regulation, 30 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 109 (2020). 
263 Fact Sheet: Modernizing Fiduciary Duty, REGENERATIVECRISISRESPONSECOMMITTEE.ORG, 
https://regenerativecrisisresponsecommittee.org/recentwork/factsheet-fiduciaryduty; THE GREEN 
SWAN, supra note X, at 50, 65; see also Guardrails to Protect the Commons, 
THESHAREHOLDERCOMMONS.COM, https://theshareholdercommons.com/guardrails/. 
264 CFTC REPORT, supra note X, at 45; Matthew Razzano, Going Green: The Federal Reserve’s 
Legal Authority to Combat Climate Change, HARV. ENV’T L. REV (Apr. 11, 2020), 
https://harvardelr.com/2020/04/11/going-green-the-federal-reserves-legal-authority-to-combat-
climate-change/. 
265 CFTC REPORT, supra note X at 45. 
266 Simon Jessep & Matthew Green, BlackRock CEO backs mandatory climate reporting, urges U.S. 
action, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-climate-change-blackrock-
idUKKBN27Q2TS; See Press Release, Allison Herren Lee supra note XX; Lee Mindy S. Lubber, 
Requiring disclosure of climate change risks makes sense for investors, companies, and the U.S. 
economy, CERES (July 17, 2019), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/requiring-disclosure-
climate-change-risks-makes-sense-investors-companies-and-us 
267 Emily Glazer, Companies Brace Themselves for New ESG Regulations Under Biden, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-brace-themselves-for-new-esg-
regulations-under-biden-11610719200?mod=searchresults_pos3&page=1; Press Release, Ceres, 
Ceres applauds SEC on creating new climate position, hiring Satyam Khanna (Feb. 1, 2021), 
https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/ceres-applauds-sec-creating-new-climate-
position-hiring-satyam-khanna. 
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might address the market-wide neglect of climate risks. No amount of disclosure, 
however, can protect the market from climate change. The only path toward 
financial stability requires halting emissions. Beyond the “market failure” of 
emissions externalities, there is a limit to what increased disclosure can facilitate in 
the face of unhedgeable systemic risks.  
 
A. UPDATE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
As discussed elsewhere, the SEC already has the legislative authority to enact 
a mandatory climate risk disclosure regime.268 Issuing climate risk disclosure 
regulations falls within the SEC’s self-defined “core mission to promote investor 
protection, market efficiency and competition, and capital formation.”269 
Systematic integration of climate risks by financial actors can help prepare 
corporations and the broader economy for both the green transition and physical 
resilience.270 A mandatory disclosure regime can help overcome both managerial 
and investor biases.271 The famous adage “you can’t manage what you don’t 
 
 
268 MADISON CONDON, SARAH LADIN, JACK LIENKE, MICHAEL PANFIL, & ALEXANDER SONG, 
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, MANDATING 
DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISKS (2021) (citing Business and Financial 
Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Release No. 33-10064, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,915, 23,969-973 
(Apr. 13, 2016) (citing Sections 7, 10, and 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77g(a)(10), 77j, and 77s(a); and Sections 3(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d), and 23(a) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78l, 78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d), and 78w(a)); see also 
CFTC Report, supra note X at 93 (describing Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley as setting out 
requirements related to disclosure controls, “including the requirement to establish, maintain, and 
regularly evaluate the effectiveness of the issuer’s disclosure controls and to have corporate officers 
certify that such controls are in place.” Further, “Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 require 
that the issuer’s principal executive officer and principal financial officer certify that the financial 
statements and other financial information included in the report do not omit a material fact.”).  
269 Virginia Harper Ho, Comply or Explain and the Future of Nonfinancial Reporting, 21 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 317, 340-41 (2017) (citing Business and Financial Disclosure Required by 
Regulation S-K: Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,917, 23,922 & n.6 & n.55 (Apr. 22, 
2016)); see also Zohar  Goshen  &  Gideon  Parchomovsky, The  Essential  Role  of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 715 (2006) (asserting that the essential role of “securities regulation 
is . . . to facilitate and protect the work of inform[ed] traders” that leads to the production of more 
information about firms’ values). 
270 J.D. Farmer et al., Sensitive Intervention Points in the Post-Carbon Transition, 364 SCIENCE 132-
134 (2019) (arguing that “Relatively modest changes to financial accounting rules or disclosure 
guidelines regarding climate change risks could have outsized effects.”). 
271 See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: Psychology Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. 
ECON. 391 (2014); Choi & Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC supra at 60, 66 (arguing 
that because “biases may persist even in the face of accurate countervailing information” disclosure 
may need to be supplemented by other regulatory action such as adjusting the definitions of 
materiality, creating antifraud liability, or educating investors). 
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measure” holds here: the very process of collecting information and assessing risk 
may help managers respond to previous under-priced and unaddressed risks.272 
Disclosure may also facilitate the construction and monitoring of ESG metrics and 
indices designed to reduce exposure to climate risk.273 
However, even under a mandatory disclosure regime, corporate managers 
maintain their share-price based incentives to potentially obscure future risks. The 
SEC must develop the expertise to evaluate whether climate-related claims about 
the future are misleading, a task that will require a substantial investment in hiring 
and collaboration with climate experts. Any mandatory climate risk disclosure 
regime has to meet climate science where it is. Regulators must pay particular 
attention to the spatial and temporal scales of requested disclosures, and ensure they 
are both scientifically feasible, and tailored to industry-specific needs.274 In 
particular, an overemphasis on false precision provided by complicated models 
might obscure the usefulness of other methods of risk assessment and 
communication.275 This fact should inform how the SEC decides to structure 
climate risk disclosure compliance, including balancing the pros and cons of 
 
 
272 See e.g., Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk 
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 786-88 (2016) (arguing, in keeping with 
a ‘information-forcing-substance theory,’ that disclosure forces managers to attend to “underlying 
details” and promotes conversations between directors, officers, and peers, about risk assessment). 
Of course, biases may persist even in the face of accurate countervailing information. Stephen J. 
Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 74 (2003). 
273 John Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk (ECGI 
Working Paper 541/2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3678197; Or aid in 
their direct regulation. Mahoney & Robertson, supra note X at X; [Rauterberg Index Theory on 
regulating indexes?]. 
274 Not all risk assessment requires the use of global climate models, which are in fact poorly suited 
to assessing sub-regional and asset-level risk exposures in the near-term. See Fiedler et al., supra 
note X at 90. 
275 Id.; Financial regulators are correct in calling for “future research… to go further and develop 
models and measures of [climate-related risks] that can be applied to individual assets.” Luiz Awazu 
Pereira da Silva, Deputy Gen. Manager of the BIS, Remarks at the Conference of the Central Banks 
and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System: Research on climate-related risks and 
financial stability: An "epistemological break"? (Apr. 17, 2019) (transcript available at 
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp190523.htm#_ftn8). Climate risk data firms like Four Twenty 
Seven—bought by Moody’s in 2019—specialize in this type of short-term physical risk assessment. 
See  Banks Are Getting Interested in Big Data to Figure Out Their Climate Risk, MARKETPLACE 
TECH (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/banks-are-getting-
interested-in-big-data-to-figure-out-their-climate-risk-2/. There may be a need for a government 
role in fostering this project, which will require “substantial new investment in high performance 
computing, climate model design and a long-term investment in climate science capability.” Fiedler 
et al. supra note X. 
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principles-based versus line-item disclosures.276 In crafting disclosure regulation, 
the SEC should draw on climate-related expertise at other federal agencies through 
interagency working groups and advisory boards.277 
 
1. Dealing With Uncertainty 
 
Issuers opposed to heightened climate risk disclosure requirements have 
sometimes argued that the large amounts of uncertainty around climate change 
makes forward-looking disclosures impossible, or misleading.278 And climate 
scientists themselves have warned that reliance on global climate models for pricing 
short-term business risk can be misguided.279 Central bank authorities, too have 
cautioned that due to complexity and non-linearity, potential unknown tipping 
points, and fat-tailed risks, macroeconomic models of long-term climate impacts 
cannot necessarily be relied upon to target policy goals.280 However, as engineers 
 
 
276 SEC Commissioner Allison Herren Lee dissented from the SEC’s recent update to regulation S-
K, arguing that the SEC’s “broad, principles-based ‘materiality’ standard” was failing to produce 
the “consistent, reliable, and comparable” information that investors want, especially with regard to 
climate risks. Press Release from Allison Herren Lee, SEC Comm’r, “Modernizing” Regulation S-
K: Ignoring the Elephant in the Room (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-
mda-2020-01-30). It’s true that the broad principles based standard gives managers too much 
discretion to withhold information. See section X supra. However some consideration must be made 
to whether specific, quantitative line-item disclosures are appropriate for certain forms of climate 
risk. This determination must be made in consultation with climate scientists and accounting experts. 
In some cases, quantitative disclosures may mask uncertainty, and may require contextual 
information like assumptions made, or error bars in order to better inform investors. 
277 See e.g., EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB), YOSEMITE.EPA.GOV, 
https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabpeople.nsf/WebCommittees/BOARD (last visited Feb. 15, 2021) 
(In 1978, upon congressional direction, the EPA established the EPA Science Advisory Board  to 
“advise the agency on broad scientific matters” as well as review scientific information used for 
agency programs and regulations); Condon et al, supra note X, at X; The IWG on the SCC is 
presently… 
278 Peabody Energy Settlement; Greg Baer, BankThink: Climate Risk Test asks Banks to Look Too 
Far Down the Road, AMERICAN BANKER (Nov. 30, 2020), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/climate-risk-test-asks-banks-to-look-too-far-down-the-
road. 
279  Fiedler et al., supra note X at X.  
280 THE GREEN SWAN, supra note X, at 3 (citing Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting 
the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. OF ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2009); Martin 
L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. OF 
ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2011)); cf. THE GREEN SWAN, supra note X, at 24 (“This does not mean 
that the development of forward-looking methodologies is not useful. On the contrary, non-financial 
and financial firms alike will increasingly need to rely on them to explore their potential 
vulnerabilities. But for central banks, regulators and supervisors concerned about the resilience of 
the system as a whole, the development of forward-looking, scenario-based methodologies should 
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focused on adaptation have warned, regulators should avoid the conflation of “deep 
uncertainty as to the distant future with potentially predictable, uncertainty as to the 
near future.”281 
One means of facilitating disclosure in the face of longer-term uncertainty is 
through scenario analysis, which delivers information about risk exposures in 
different future possible states of the world, without assigning probability to those 
futures. 282 This method helps to deliver information to investors without glossing 
over the high degree of uncertainty when estimating energy sector transitions, 
warming pathways, and climactic responses. The SEC should consider whether or 
not to construct and provide specific scenarios for companies to report against.283 
When the choice of scenario is left up to issuer discretion, they may choose 
scenarios favorable to their prospects: cherry-picking future warming pathways or 
regulatory (in)action favorable to their companies’ future.284 
 
 
be assessed with a more critical stance.”); M Alexander Pearl, The (Next) Big Short and the End of 
the Anthropocene, 3 UTAH L. REV. 383, 417 (2019) (arguing that climate models parallel models in 
the subprime mortgage crisis which often failed of models to adequately incorporate complexity and 
systemic risks). 
281 James Doss-Gollin, David Farnham, Michelle Ho & Upmanu Lall, Adaptation Over Fatalism: 
Leveraging High-Impact Climate Disasters to Boost Societal Resilience, 4 J. WATER RESOURCES 
PLAN. MGMT. 146 (2020) (pointing out that “successful identification and prediction of climate on 
subseasonal to decadal timescales… can be used to inform the development of tools to alleviate the 
impact of weather and climate hazards”); see also Theodore supra note X at X. 
282 TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, THE USE OF SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
IN DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES (2017).  
283 CFTC Report, supra note X at 74 n. 5 (The CFTC suggests that “One option for standardizing 
baseline projections would be to calibrate a model to a projection from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook. These projections, however, apply only to fossil fuel-
related CO2 emissions and thus would not include projections of other gases and sources in the 
United States.”) 
284 Kate Mackenzie, The Trouble with Climate Change Scenarios is Everyone Has Their Own, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-07/the-trouble-
with-climate-change-scenarios-is-everyone-has-their-own. Indeed, the NYAG found that Peabody 
Energy disclosed the results of only one of three International Energy Agency scenarios it had 
analyzed—the scenario with the largest projected coal demand due to global climate regulation 
failure. Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., supra note 93. The investigation found 
that in its projections of the future, Peabody frequently referred in public statements to results 
of only one of the [International Energy Agency] IEA’s three scenarios for worldwide coal 
demand:  the ‘Current Policies Scenario,’ a status-quo scenario that predicts rising future demand 
for coal based on an assumption that governments will fail to adopt any new policies or 
regulations to reduce the amount of climate change pollution—even policies and regulations 
that the IEA deems governments are likely to adopt.  In doing so, Peabody failed to disclose the 
IEA’s other two scenarios, which are much less favorable projections of world coal demand by the 
IEA. There are also complaints from investors that even when companies use the same scenarios 
they often report different types of information gleaned from the analysis, making it very hard to 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782675
Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble 
 
    53 
However, as leading practitioner Margaret Peloso has warned, standardizing 
scenarios can also mask uncertainty.285 She notes that the vast majority of U.S. oil 
and gas companies reporting under the TCFD framework use the IEA energy 
demand scenarios, in part because of investor expectations. These scenarios predict 
an orderly transition away from fossil fuels, a “robust” demand for natural gas 
through 2040, and largely ignore potential short-term stressors.286 Universal 
reliance on one projection of future transition pathways could in fact amplify the 
harmful effects of a surprised market, rather than diminish them. Peloso encourages 
thinking of scenario analysis “as a tool for imagination” in which corporate 
resilience is strengthened through the consideration of a wide variety of scenarios: 
short-term, long-term, and those that include potential “double black swan” events. 
She warns that if you “reduce scenario analysis to a cookbook” you constrain the 
creative thinking necessary for imagining the potential for multiple and converging 
climate-related risks.287  
 
2. Engaging with Auditors and PCAOB 
 
Securities regulators face a balancing challenge when designing disclosure 
regimes: how to give investors the information they need without either 
overwhelming them with data or revealing competitive trade secrets. Auditors play 
a key role in this balancing act. And while climate change can materially impact 
many of the disclosure metrics already required in official financial statements, the 
U.S. auditing industry is prey to many of the same myopic drivers discussed 
 
 
compare disclosures across companies. Institute for Policy Integrity, Margaret Peloso at Corporate 
Climate Risk: Assessment, Disclosure, and Action, Panel 2: The Current State of Corporate Climate 
Disclosure and Applications, YOUTUBE (Oct. 2, 2020), https://youtu.be/caxY0jIM0b8; CFTC 
REPORT supra note X at 81 (arguing that regulators “should develop and prescribe a consistent and 
common set of scenarios and assumptions” which would allow for “better comparability across 
results and encourage the development of universal scenario analysis capabilities”).  
285 Margaret Peloso at Corporate Climate Risk, supra note 245. 
286 Id. (Peloso noting that none of her clients in the oil and gas industry were using scenarios that 
came close to capturing the price-stress experienced by the collapse of OPEC in early 2020.) The 
IEA’s past scenarios have been criticized for poorly anticipating how quickly renewable energy 
became cost-competitive. See, e.g., Simon Evans, ‘Profound shifts’ underway in energy system, says 
IEA World Energy Outlook, CARBONBRIEF (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.carbonbrief.org/profound-
shifts-underway-in-energy-system-says-iea-world-energy-outlook; Gero Rueter, Is the IEA 
underestimating renewables?, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-
iea-underestimating-renewables/a-43137071. 
287 Regulators should consider requiring that all underlying assumptions used to construct scenarios 
be disclosed, including metrics such as economic life of assets and the percentage of valuation that 
can be attributed to future growth. See PCAOB 
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infra.288 Even those companies that voluntarily report under the TCFD framework, 
and include climate in management’s discussion of risk, fail to clarify whether their 
financial reporting considers these risks.289  
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was established by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee the audits of public companies. PCAOB 
Board Member Robert Brown has argued that auditors are failing to include 
climate-related risks in their discussions of Critical Audit Matters (CAMs), meant 
to point out aspects of the audit that “involved especially challenging, subjective, 
or complex auditor judgment.”290 Because climate-related risks to companies are 
“highly dependent upon the particular assumptions used by management,” you 
might expect them to be discussed in CAMs covering the reasonableness of 
assumptions related to asset lives or commodity prices, yet very few mention 
climate.291   
The SEC should work together with the PCAOB to encourage auditor oversight 
and assurance of corporate climate risk reporting, including that the reporting is 
consistent with disclosed financial statements.292 The PCAOB should develop 
resources and guidance for assisting auditors in this role and using tools like 
scenario analysis. Through its oversight of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, the SEC should ensure that climate risk considerations are included in U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).293 As the Financial Times 
 
 
288 AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, CLIMATE-RELATED AND OTHER EMERGING 
RISKS DISCLOSURES: ASSESSING FINANCIAL STATEMENT MATERIALITY USING AASB/IASB 
PRACTICE STATEMENT 2 (2019) (“The potential financial implications arising from climate-related 
and other emerging risks may include, but are not limited to: asset impairment; changes in the useful 
life of assets; changes in the fair valuation of assets due to climate-related and emerging risks; 
increased costs and/or reduced demand for products and services affecting impairment calculations 
and/or requiring recognition of provisions for onerous contracts; potential provisions and contingent 
liabilities arising from fines and penalties; and changes in expected credit losses for loans and other 
financial assets.”) 
289 THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE, INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS FOR 
PARIS-ALIGNED ACCOUNTS 4 (2020). 
290 THE AUDITOR'S REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS WHEN THE AUDITOR 
EXPRESSES AN UNQUALIFIED OPINION, PCAOB Release No. 2017-001 (PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING 
OVERSIGHT BD. 2017). CAMs provide a means for the auditor to speak directly to the investor, 
whereas the rest of the financial statement comes from management and rests on management’s 
assumptions. 
291 Id. 
292 Samantha Ross, Role of Accounting and Assurance in Addressing Climate Risk, W.P. (2021). 
293 Samantha Ross, Ceres Report. The IFRS is proposing to establish a Sustainability Standards 
Board. If the SEC were to partner in this project it could be a step toward convergence of GAAP 
and IFRS standards. See Comparability in International Accounting Standards – A Brief History, 
FASB.ORG, https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176156304264 (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2020). 
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recently argued, climate risks may be uncertain, “but so is the time value of 
money.”294 
 
3. Provision of Climate-Risk Assessment Tools and Data 
 
Information asymmetries are typically thought of in corporate disclosure theory 
as one-way.295 But climate risk is a case in which the information breakdown 
happens in two directions. Investors do not have information on exactly where 
assets are, where the suppliers are based, what route supply chains travel over, what 
design specifications were used to build key infrastructure. A manager knows these 
facts better than shareholders, but doesn’t necessarily understand the predictive 
science of climate impacts any better. If behavioral biases and informational 
transaction costs are getting in the way of the average company and the average 
shareholder assessing their risk exposure, there is a role for regulators to lower these 
costs of information acquisition. At the minimum, there should be a website where 
you can plug in an address or coordinates and see what sea level rise will be under 
different levels of warming, or expected number of days over threshold 
temperatures. Civil society has begun to fill this void, but the resources and 
authority of the federal government are sorely needed.296 
The SEC’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) serves as the 
SEC’s “think tank,” and is tasked with integrating financial economics and data 
analytics “into the core mission of the SEC.”297 DERA’s Offices of Risk 
Assessments and Data Science facilitate enforcement by “developing customized, 
analytic tools and analyses to proactively detect market risks indicative of possible 
 
 
294 Opinion, Time to Clean up Climate Reporting Standards, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2021),  
https://www.ft.com/content/4f4a8485-4eed-4228-8ce2-ec199d40829c. 
295 See, e.g., Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The Significance of 
Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 278 (2002) (arguing for mandatory securities disclosure to address 
information asymmetries in the wake of Enron). 
296 See CFTC Report, supra note X at 60 (“The challenge ahead will be to balance both the public 
and private objectives in the interests of both transparency and innovation.”); see also, U.S. GLOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, OUR CHANGING PLANET: THE U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH 
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020, https://downloads.globalchange.gov/ocp/ocp2020/Our-
Changing-Planet_FY-2020.pdf. 
297 U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, ABOUT THE DIVISION OF ECONOMIC AND RISK 
ANALYSIS, https://www.sec.gov/dera/Article/dera-
about.html#:~:text=The%20Division%20of%20Economic%20and,making%2C%20enforcement%
2C%20and%20examination, (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). DERA is involved in both rulemaking and 
enforcement, and its duties include “identifying and analyzing issues, trends, and innovations in the 
marketplace” and “working with outside experts in academia and industry to strengthen the 
Commission’s foundation of market knowledge.” 
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violations.”298 The SEC should build institutional competency within DERA and 
its offices, and work with other agencies, including the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council, to provide climate-risk information and assessment tools to 
investors and the public.299  
B. LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE 
 
While accurate disclosure of climate risks can help make individual companies 
and investors more prepared for the physical risks of climate change, and can 
smooth, and perhaps hasten, the transition to a net-zero economy, it alone cannot 
correct the most significant “market failure” of climate change externalities: 
unregulated emissions. As Bolton et al. point out: “climate-related risks will remain 
unhedgeable as long as system-wide transformations are not undertaken.”300 With 
supply chain risks, for example, the knowledge that your local port has a high risk 
of being wiped out by a hurricane has limited use when shipping alternatives do not 
exist.301 However, a better market understanding of the risks of climate change may 
help to reduce political opposition to emissions regulations market actors become 
more aware of the economic costs of failing to regulate emissions. 
The CFTC’s report on Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System 
acknowledges that disclosure alone cannot address “the heart of the matter,” 
unabated greenhouse gas emissions.302 Direct regulation of emissions is 
necessary.303 What the CFTC does not note, however, is that direct regulation is 
required to address physical risks and adaptation deficits as well, not just mitigation 




299 Oversight of climate services…  
300 THE GREEN SWAN, supra note X at 4; Id. at 43 (arguing that “current efforts aimed at measuring, 
managing and supervising climate-related risks will only make sense if they take place within an 
institutional environment involving coordination with monetary and fiscal authorities, as well as 
broader societal changes”) 
301 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
253 (2009) (“Issuer disclosure may reduce risk—on average bringing price closer, on one side or 
the other, to actual value—but it reduces only unsystematic risk.”). 
302 CFTC Report, supra note X at xix.  
303 The CFTC Report’s first recommendation to regulators is listing “establish a price on carbon.” 
Id. at 9. However, “carbon prices alone may not suffice to shift individual behaviour and firms’ 
replacement of physical capital towards low-carbon alternatives until infrastructures suited for 
alternative energies are in place. For instance, building an efficient public transit system may be a 
precondition to effective taxation of individual car use in urban areas.” THE GREEN SWAN, supra 
note X, at 56-57 (citing Signe Krogstrup and William Oman, Macroeconomic and Financial 
Policies for Climate Change (IMF, Working Paper No. 19/185, 2019); Id. at 28 (arguing that past 
energy transformation were brought about not just by changes in relative pricing, but were also 
heavily influenced by socioeconomic, geopolitical, and institutional systems). 
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in this Article. Governments have an urgent role to play in ensuring that credit 
rating agencies, zoning laws, professional organizations, building codes, and 
municipalities are considering and responding to climate risks. Australian insurance 
giant Suncorp for example, has argued for its government to impose “compulsory 
adoption” of climate change adaptation plans on corporations.304 It and AIG have 
both called for governments to invest resources in climate adaptation, including 
flood infrastructure, updated building codes, and longer-term climate adaptation 
planning.305 Regulators should consider a program of infrastructure audits.306  
Disclosure is further insufficient because individual steps taken to limit the 
risk exposure of certain assets may counter-productively contribute to overall risk 
in the system. This can happen in both the financial and real economies.307 
Individual adaptation to climate change, like the construction of seawalls, may lead 
to the generation of broader systemic risks. The “levee effect” describes how flood 
protection infrastructure can encourage more people to locate in a risky area, 
increasing the damage that occurs when the infrastructure fails.308 Climate 





As discussed supra, firm directors and managers are typically compensated via 
stock or stock options in order to incentivize maximization of the share price. 
However, as argued by Lynn Stout: “If market prices do not closely reflect actual 
expected risks and returns, [a] single-minded focus on share price is a recipe for 
mismanagement.”310 Shareholders, as monitors of corporate management, should 
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examine the metrics by which executive compensation is determined and push for 
the removal of those that distort managers away from long-term stewardship.311 
Investors are increasingly advocating for the integration of climate-related metrics 
in executive remuneration.312 According to a 2020 PWC survey, 34% of directors 
said they would support linking executive compensation directly to ESG metrics.313 
Further, shareholders have the power to influence board composition. Increasing 
board competency on climate change may also help to oversee that management is 
investigating and disclosing relevant risks.314  
Large institutional shareholders should have a particular interest in how climate 
constitutes a systematic risk to portfolios, as these unhedgeable risks cannot be 
diversified away.315 These institutions have already been advocating for increased 
disclosure of climate risks. While they may not rely on the information to make 
trades, they should integrate climate risks into their governance oversight of 
portfolio companies. This may include taking a portfolio perspective, and seeking 




After the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
directed the (mostly corporate) operators of America’s 60 nuclear power plants to 
assess their exposure to flood risk.317 Of these, the Commission found that 54 of 
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the plants were not designed to handle their current flood risks, including 19 whose 
designs could not withstand possible present-day storm surges.318 The assessment 
did not extend to consider future climate risks. The rest of corporate America lacks 
an industry-focused regulator to mandate hazard assessment, and yet is similarly 
exposed to the risks of obsolete designs colliding with a changed natural world. 
This Article has sought to expose why climate risks remain unassessed and unpriced 
by the market. An updated mandatory climate risk disclosure regime, designed in 
consultation with climate scientists and auditing professionals, is a necessary first 
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